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Unions and the Labor Market for Managers

Author

Listed:
  • DiNardo, John

    (University of Michigan)

  • Hallock, Kevin F.

    (Cornell University)

  • Pischke, Jörn-Steffen

    (London School of Economics)

Abstract

We examine the relationship between the employment and compensation of managers and CEOs and the presence of a unionized workforce. We develop a simple efficiency wage model, with a tradeoff between higher wages for workers and more monitoring, which requires more managers. The model also assumes rent sharing between workers, managers and the owners of the firm. Unions, by redistributing rents towards the workers, lead to lower employment and lower pay for managers. Using a variety of data sets, we examine the implications of the model for the relationship between the employment and wages of managers and unionization. We find several results generally consistent with our model. (1) Both a higher fraction of unionization in an industry and region and a higher union wage differential are associated with fewer managers. (2) Managers wages are about 5 to 7 percent lower in unionized firms. (3) For CEOs the effects are larger: a 10 percent increase in unionization reduces the pay of CEOs by 2.5 percent or more.

Suggested Citation

  • DiNardo, John & Hallock, Kevin F. & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 2000. "Unions and the Labor Market for Managers," IZA Discussion Papers 150, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp150
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Henry S Farber & Daniel Herbst & Ilyana Kuziemko & Suresh Naidu, 2021. "Unions and Inequality over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 136(3), pages 1325-1385.
    3. Juan E. Jacobo, 2022. "Back to the Surplus: An Unorthodox Neoclassical Model of Growth, Distribution and Unemployment with Technical Change," Papers 2211.14978, arXiv.org.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(2), pages 173-192, Spring.
    5. Gomez, Rafael & Tzioumis, Konstantinos, 2006. "What do unions do to executive compensation?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19865, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Kuhnen, Camelia M. & Niessen-Ruenzi, Alexandra, 2008. "Is Executive Compensation Shaped by Public Attitudes?," CFR Working Papers 08-09, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    7. Muhammad Umar Boodoo, 2016. "Do heavily-unionized companies compensate their CEOs less in periods of financial distress? Evidence from Canadian companies during the financial crisis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67557, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Kilman, Josefin, 2020. "Monetary Policy and Income Inequality in the United States: The Role of Labor Unions," Working Papers 2020:10, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 20 Sep 2022.
    9. Lisa Dorigatti & Roberto Pedersini, 2021. "Industrial relations and inequality: the many conditions of a crucial relationship," Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, , vol. 27(1), pages 11-27, February.
    10. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Ekonomia kontra polityka: niebezpieczne rady w kwestiach polityki ekonomicznej," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 11-12, pages 113-136.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    executives; managers; unions; wage structure; CEOs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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