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Testing for Market Power in Beef Packing: Where Are We and What's Next?

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  • Weninger, Quinn
  • Hunnicutt, Lynn

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  • Weninger, Quinn & Hunnicutt, Lynn, 1999. "Testing for Market Power in Beef Packing: Where Are We and What's Next?," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10575, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:10575
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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 176-183, May.
    2. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    3. Schroeter, John R. & Azzam, Azzeddine M., 1990. "Measuring Market Power in Multi-Product Oligopolies: The U.S. Meat Industry," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11112, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. Rosen, Sherwin & Murphy, Kevin M & Scheinkman, Jose A, 1994. "Cattle Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 468-492, June.
    5. John Haltiwanger & Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 1991. "The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 89-106, Spring.
    6. Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, 1997. "Collusion Over the Business Cycle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 82-106, Spring.
    7. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1992. "Collusive Pricing with Capacity Constraints in the Presence of Demand Uncertainty," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 203-220, Summer.
    8. Stephen R. Koontz & Philip Garcia & Michael A. Hudson, 1993. "Meatpacker Conduct in Fed Cattle Pricing: An Investigation of Oligopsony Power," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 75(3), pages 537-548.
    9. Stephen R. Koontz, 1999. "Marketing Agreement Impacts in an Experimental Market for Fed Cattle," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(2), pages 347-358.
    10. John Schroeter & Azzeddine Azzam, 1991. "Marketing Margins, Market Power, and Price Uncertainty," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 73(4), pages 990-999.
    11. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
    12. repec:ags:vtaesp:232464 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
    14. Jones, Rodney & Purcell, Wayne & Driscoll, Paul & Peterson, Everett, 1996. "Issues and Cautions in Employing Behavioral Modeling Approaches to Test for Market Power," Staff Papers 232517, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    15. Sanjib Bhuyan & Rigoberto A. Lopez, 1997. "Oligopoly Power in the Food and Tobacco Industries," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(3), pages 1035-1043.
    16. Paul J. Driscoll & S. Murthy Kambhampaty & Wayne D. Purcell, 1997. "Nonparametric Tests of Profit Maximization in Oligopoly with Application to the Beef Packing Industry," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(3), pages 872-879.
    17. Azzeddine Azzam, 1998. "Captive Supplies, Market Conduct, and the Open-Market Price," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(1), pages 76-83.
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    Cited by:

    1. Koontz, Stephen R. & Purcell, Wayne D., 2000. "Research Programs To Address Price Discovery Concerns," 2000 Annual Meeting, June 29-July 1, 2000, Vancouver, British Columbia 36421, Western Agricultural Economics Association.
    2. Jared G. Carlberg & Robert J. Hogan & Clement E. Ward, 2009. "Game theory application to Fed Cattle procurement in an experimental market," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(1), pages 56-69.

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