IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jindec/v64y2016i4p808-834.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Collusion Under Risk Aversion and Fixed Costs

Author

Listed:
  • Dan Bernhardt
  • Mahdi Rastad

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Bernhardt & Mahdi Rastad, 2016. "Collusion Under Risk Aversion and Fixed Costs," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(4), pages 808-834, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:64:y:2016:i:4:p:808-834
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/joie.12111
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David E. Buschena & Jeffrey M. Perloff, 1991. "The Creation of Dominant Firm Market Power in the Coconut Oil Export Market," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 73(4), pages 1000-1008.
    2. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    3. Severin Boreinstein & Andrea Shepard, 1996. "Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 429-451, Autumn.
    4. Volker Nocke & John Thanassoulis, 2014. "Vertical Relations Under Credit Constraints," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 337-367, April.
    5. Greenwald, Bruce C & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Asymmetric Information and the New Theory of the Firm: Financial Constraints and Risk Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 160-165, May.
    6. John Haltiwanger & Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 1991. "The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 89-106, Spring.
    7. Buschena, David E. & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1990. "The creation of dominant firm market power in the coconut oil export market," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt9c5124mq, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    8. Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, 1997. "Collusion Over the Business Cycle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 82-106, Spring.
    9. Karp, Larry S & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1989. "Dynamic Oligopoly in the Rice Export Market," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 71(3), pages 462-470, August.
    10. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1992. "Collusive Pricing with Capacity Constraints in the Presence of Demand Uncertainty," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 203-220, Summer.
    11. Asplund, Marcus, 2002. "Risk-averse firms in oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 995-1012, September.
    12. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005. "Managerial incentives and collusive behavior," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1501-1523, August.
    13. Karp, Larry & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1990. "A Dynamic Model of Oligopoly in the Coffee Export Market," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt6m80c6nx, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    14. Sandmo, Agnar, 1971. "On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 65-73, March.
    15. Chevalier, Judith A & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Capital-Market Imperfections and Countercyclical Markups: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 703-725, September.
    16. Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1986. "Measures of Risk Aversion and Comparative Statics of Industry Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 524-529, June.
    17. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
    18. Aiginger, Karl & Mueller, Dennis C. & Weiss, Christoph, 1998. "Objectives, topics and methods in industrial organization during the nineties: Results from a survey," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(6), pages 799-830, November.
    19. Michihiro Kandori, 1991. "Correlated Demand Shocks and Price Wars During Booms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(1), pages 171-180.
    20. Domowitz, Ian & Hubbard, R Glenn & Petersen, Bruce C, 1987. "Oligopoly Supergames: Some Empirical Evidence on Prices and Margins," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 379-398, June.
    21. Franco Mariuzzo & Patrick Paul Walsh, 2013. "Commodity Market Dynamics and the Joint Executive Committee, 1880–1886," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(5), pages 1722-1739, December.
    22. Larry S. Karp & Jeffrey M. Perloff, 1993. "A Dynamic Model of Oligopoly in the Coffee Export Market," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 75(2), pages 448-457.
    23. Rosenbaum, David I. & Sukharomana, Supachat, 2001. "Oligopolistic pricing over the deterministic market demand cycle: some evidence from the US Portland cement industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 863-884, May.
    24. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 37-57, Spring.
    25. Meghan Busse, 2002. "Firm Financial Condition and Airline Price Wars," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 298-318, Summer.
    26. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1999. "On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 127-139, November.
    27. Knittel, Christopher R. & Lepore, Jason J., 2010. "Tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 131-144, March.
    28. Meghan R. Busse, 2002. "Firm Financial Condition and Airline Price Wars," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm281, Yale School of Management.
    29. Fabra, Natalia, 2006. "Collusion with capacity constraints over the business cycle," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 69-81, January.
    30. Valerie Y. Suslow, 2005. "Cartel contract duration: empirical evidence from inter-war international cartels," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 14(5), pages 705-744, October.
    31. Porter, Robert H, 1985. "On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 415-426, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Béatrice Boulu-Reshef & Constance Monnier-Schlumberger, 2019. "Lutte contre les cartels : comment dissuader les têtes brûlées ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 70(6), pages 1187-1199.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Carmen García & Joan Ramon Borrell & José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro & Juan Luis Jiménez, 2022. "Managers’ expectations, business cycles and cartels’ life cycle," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 451-484, June.
    2. Pedro Dal Bó, 2007. "Tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 533-540, June.
    3. Knittel, Christopher R. & Lepore, Jason J., 2010. "Tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 131-144, March.
    4. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2011. "Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(2), pages 455-492.
    5. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    6. Spiegel, Yossi & Stahl, Konrad, 2014. "Industry structure and pricing over the business cycle," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-039, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, 1997. "Collusion Over the Business Cycle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 82-106, Spring.
    8. Johannes Paha, 2013. "The Impact of Persistent Shocks and Concave Objective Functions on Collusive Behavior," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201328, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    9. Knittel, Christopher R. & Lepore, Jason J., 2010. "Tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 131-144, March.
    10. Asplund, Marcus & Eriksson, Rickard & Strand, Niklas, 2001. "Prices, Margins and Liquidity Constraints: Swedish Newspapers 1990-1996," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 470, Stockholm School of Economics.
    11. Switgard Feuerstein, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 163-198, December.
    12. Pedro Dal Bo, 2002. "Three Essays on Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000038, David K. Levine.
    13. Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 2000. "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 207-236, Summer.
    14. Johri, Alok, 2001. "Markups and the Seasonal Cycle," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 367-395, July.
    15. Robert Gagné & Simon van Norden & Bruno Versaevel, 2003. "Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms Under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-57, CIRANO.
    16. Fabra, Natalia, 2006. "Collusion with capacity constraints over the business cycle," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 69-81, January.
    17. Zhang, Yahua & Round, David K., 2011. "Price wars and price collusion in China's airline markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 361-372, July.
    18. Pedro Dal Bó, 2005. "Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1591-1604, December.
    19. João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2014. "Sustaining collusion in markets with a general evolution of demand," FEP Working Papers 537, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    20. Johannes Paha, 2017. "The Value of Collusion with Endogenous Capacity and Demand Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 623-653, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:64:y:2016:i:4:p:808-834. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.