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Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier

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Abstract

Medical technology making kidney transplantation over the blood group barrier possible is now a reality. This paper investigates how such technology should be implemented when designing pairwise kidney exchange programs. The possibility to receive a kidney transplant from a blood group incompatible donor motivates an extension of the preference domain, allowing patients to distinguish between compatible donors and half-compatible donors (i.e., blood group incompatible donors that are made compatible using immunosuppressive drugs). It is demonstrated that the number of transplants can be increased by providing an incentive for patients with half-compatible donors to participate in kidney exchange programs. The results also suggest that the technology is beneficial for patient groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in kidney exchange programs (e.g., blood group O patients). The positive effect of allowing transplants over the blood group barrier is larger than the corresponding effects of including compatible patient-donor pairs and allowing three-way exchanges in addition to pairwise exchanges.

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  • Andersson, Tommy & Kratz, Jörgen, 2016. "Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier," Working Papers 2016:11, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 29 Nov 2017.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2016_011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku, 2014. "Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 105-129.
    2. Tayfun Sönmez & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 828-851, June.
    3. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
    4. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Kidney Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488.
    5. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Unver, Utku & Delmonico, Francis & Saidman, Susan L., 2014. "Utilizing List Exchange and Non-directed Donation through “Chain” Paired Kidney Donations," MPRA Paper 58246, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Saidman, Susan L. & Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Unver, M. Utku & Delmonico, Francis L., 2014. "Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges," MPRA Paper 58247, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 376-380, May.
    8. Okumura, Yasunori, 2014. "Priority matchings revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 242-249.
    9. Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2018. "How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 193-231.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mohammad Akbarpour & Julien Combe & Yinghua He & Victor Hiller & Robert Shimer & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money," Post-Print halshs-02973042, HAL.
    2. Andrew M. Jones, 2019. "Time flies …," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(10), pages 1161-1162, October.
    3. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2020. "Short trading cycles: Paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 78-87.
    4. Haluk Ergin & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2020. "Efficient and Incentive‐Compatible Liver Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 965-1005, May.
    5. Jorgen Kratz, 2019. "Triage in Kidney Exchange," Discussion Papers 19/04, Department of Economics, University of York.
    6. Eun Jeong Heo & Sunghoon Hong & Youngsub Chun, 2021. "Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 1-19, July.
    7. Tayfun Sönmez & M Utku Ünver, 2017. "Market design for living-donor organ exchanges: an economic policy perspective," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 676-704.
    8. Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2018. "How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 193-231.
    9. Radu-Stefan Mincu & Péter Biró & Márton Gyetvai & Alexandru Popa & Utkarsh Verma, 2021. "IP solutions for international kidney exchange programmes," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 29(2), pages 403-423, June.
    10. Biró, Péter & van de Klundert, Joris & Manlove, David & Pettersson, William & Andersson, Tommy & Burnapp, Lisa & Chromy, Pavel & Delgado, Pablo & Dworczak, Piotr & Haase, Bernadette & Hemke, Aline & J, 2021. "Modelling and optimisation in European Kidney Exchange Programmes," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 291(2), pages 447-456.
    11. Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, 2017. "Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences," Discussion Papers 17/13, Department of Economics, University of York.
    12. Haris Aziz & Agnes Cseh, 2019. "Optimal Kidney Exchange with Immunosuppressants," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1915, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    market design; pairwise kidney exchange; blood group incompatibility; priority matchings; half-compatibility priority matchings;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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