IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/jeehcn/v27y2021i1p51-74n4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bioethics, Rent-Seeking, and Death: Examining the Opposition to Kidney Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Lemennicier Bertrand

    (Center for Research in Law and Economics (CRED), Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris, France)

  • Wenzel Nikolai G.

    (Center for Research in Law and Economics (CRED), Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris, France)

Abstract

The market for kidneys offers a case study of Baptists and Bootleggers. In almost every country, sales are currently illegal and donated organs are allocated by a central planner. Thousands of people die every year, because of the shortage caused by the absence of markets. This paper starts by examining the free-market alternative, and shows that a market would solve the shortage (and thus unnecessary deaths). It then uses gains-from-trade analysis to explain why current vested interests oppose a move to a market, despite the immense potential for saved lives. In a shift to a market, gains from trade would be distributed away from lucky patients (who receive a zero-price kidney) and various industries that benefit from the shortage (dialysis, medical equipment, etc.); these “Bootleggers” form an alliance with “Baptists” (altruistic donors, large segments of the bioethics community, and organ allocation central planners).

Suggested Citation

  • Lemennicier Bertrand & Wenzel Nikolai G., 2021. "Bioethics, Rent-Seeking, and Death: Examining the Opposition to Kidney Markets," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 27(1), pages 51-74, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:27:y:2021:i:1:p:51-74:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/jeeh-2020-0005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/jeeh-2020-0005
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/jeeh-2020-0005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tayfun Sönmez & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 828-851, June.
    2. Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 79-112.
    3. Gary S. Becker & Julio Jorge Elías, 2007. "Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live and Cadaveric Organ Donations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 3-24, Summer.
    4. Roth, Alvin E. & Leider, Stephen, 2010. "Kidneys For Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?," Scholarly Articles 5128483, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    5. Matthew Rabin & Ted O'Donoghue, 1999. "Doing It Now or Later," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 103-124, March.
    6. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    7. Peter T. Leeson, 2019. "Do we need behavioral economics to explain law?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 29-42, August.
    8. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 351-401, June.
    9. Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, 1994. "Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 45-64, Fall.
    10. Julio J. Elias & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, 2015. "Sacred Values? The Effect of Information on Attitudes toward Payments for Human Organs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 361-365, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sandro Ambuehl, 2017. "An Offer You Can't Refuse? Testing Undue Inducement," CESifo Working Paper Series 6296, CESifo.
    2. Sandro Ambuehl & B. Douglas Bernheim & Axel Ockenfels, 2019. "Projective Paternalism," CESifo Working Paper Series 7762, CESifo.
    3. Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, 2012. "Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2018-2047, August.
    4. Julio J. Elias & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, 2015. "Sacred Values? The Effect of Information on Attitudes toward Payments for Human Organs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 361-365, May.
    5. , & , E., 2014. "Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
    6. Eames, K.C. & Holder, Patrick & Zambrano, Eduardo, 2017. "Solving the kidney shortage via the creation of kidney donation co-operatives," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 91-97.
    7. Julio Elias & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, 2017. "Understanding repugnance: Implications for public policy," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 614, Universidad del CEMA.
    8. Kim, Jaehong & Li, Mengling & Xu, Menghan, 2021. "Organ donation with vouchers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    9. Caroline Flammer & Michael W. Toffel & Kala Viswanathan, 2021. "Shareholder activism and firms' voluntary disclosure of climate change risks," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(10), pages 1850-1879, October.
    10. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    11. Stephen L. Cheung & Agnieszka Tymula & Xueting Wang, 2022. "Present bias for monetary and dietary rewards," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(4), pages 1202-1233, September.
    12. Andreoni, James & Serra-Garcia, Marta, 2021. "Time inconsistent charitable giving," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    13. Jawwad Noor, 2005. "Choice and Normative Preference," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-039, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    14. De Paola, Maria & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2015. "Procrastination, academic success and the effectiveness of a remedial program," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 217-236.
    15. Jawwad Noor, 2005. "Temptation, Welfare and Revealed Preference," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-15, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    16. Stefano DellaVigna, 2009. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 315-372, June.
    17. Jonathan D. Cohen, 2005. "The Vulcanization of the Human Brain: A Neural Perspective on Interactions Between Cognition and Emotion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 3-24, Fall.
    18. Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D., 2021. "Value computation and modulation: A neuroeconomic theory of self-control as constrained optimization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    19. Meier, Stephan & Sprenger, Charles, 2010. "Stability of Time Preferences," IZA Discussion Papers 4756, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Li, Mengling & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Xu, Menghan, 2023. "Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 403-427.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bioethics; kidney markets; organ markets; rent-seeking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:27:y:2021:i:1:p:51-74:n:4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.