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Do we need behavioral economics to explain law?

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  • Peter T. Leeson

    (George Mason University, MS 3G4)

Abstract

Do we need behavioral economics to explain law? I analyze Judge Guido Calabresi’s claim that we do. I find that, actually, we don’t; traditional economic theory can explain law just fine.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter T. Leeson, 2019. "Do we need behavioral economics to explain law?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 29-42, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:48:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10657-017-9573-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-017-9573-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth, Alvin E. & Leider, Stephen, 2010. "Kidneys For Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?," Scholarly Articles 5128483, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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    4. James M. Buchanan, 1954. "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 114-114.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    6. Stigler, George J, 1992. "Law or Economics?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 455-468, October.
    7. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    8. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    9. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lemennicier Bertrand & Wenzel Nikolai G., 2021. "Bioethics, Rent-Seeking, and Death: Examining the Opposition to Kidney Markets," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 27(1), pages 51-74, June.
    2. Vincent Geloso & Raymond J. March, 2021. "Rent seeking for madness: the political economy of mental asylums in the United States, 1870 to 1910," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 375-404, December.
    3. Daniel J. Smith & Macy Scheck, 2023. "Examining the public interest rationale for regulating whiskey with the pure food and drugs act," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 85-122, July.
    4. Alain Marciano & Giovanni Battista Ramello, 2019. "Law, economics and Calabresi on the future of law and economics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 65-76, August.
    5. Luke Petach, 2024. "The timber wars: the endangered species act, the northwest forest plan, and the political economy of timber management in the Pacific northwest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(1), pages 209-226, January.
    6. Callais, Justin T & Geloso, Vincent, 2023. "The political economy of lighthouses in antebellum America," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Calabresi; Behavioral economics; Rent-seeking; Merit goods; Altruism; Organ sales; Conscription; Minneapolis 5% tradition; The Future of Law and Economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)

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