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Congestion and scarcity in scheduled transport modes

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Abstract

This is a draft text for a chapter in Handbook on Research Methods in Transport Economics and Policy to be published by Edward Elgar Publishing. It provides an overview of issues related to scarcity in scheduled transport modes with emphasis on railways. The paper separates the scarcity or time-tabling problem into two analytical parts. The first concerns the challenges related with finding an approximate solution to the mathematically challenging NP complete problem. The second generic problem is related to base the solution to this challenge on the operators’ value of each departure slot.

Suggested Citation

  • Nilsson, Jan-Eric, 2012. "Congestion and scarcity in scheduled transport modes," Working papers in Transport Economics 2012:25, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:ctswps:2012_025
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    File URL: http://www.transportportal.se/SWoPEc/CTS-2012-25.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Chris Nash, 2005. "Rail Infrastructure Charges in Europe," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 39(3), pages 259-278, September.
    7. Johnson Daniel & Nash Chris, 2008. "Charging for Scarce Rail Capacity in Britain: A Case Study," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-24, March.
    8. Severin Borenstein, 1988. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Operating Licenses," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(2), pages 357-385.
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    Cited by:

    1. Beria, Paolo & Grimaldi, Raffaele, 2013. "Appraising the benefits of bottleneck removal in rail transport: a simplified CBA approach," MPRA Paper 46889, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Time-tabling; Track scarcity; Runway scarcity; Willingness to pay;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • R42 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government and Private Investment Analysis; Road Maintenance; Transportation Planning

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