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Towards a welfare enhancing process to manage railway infrastructure access

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  • Nilsson, Jan-Eric

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  • Nilsson, Jan-Eric, 2002. "Towards a welfare enhancing process to manage railway infrastructure access," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 419-436, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:transa:v:36:y:2002:i:5:p:419-436
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    2. U. Brännlund & P. O. Lindberg & A. Nõu & J.-E. Nilsson, 1998. "Railway Timetabling Using Lagrangian Relaxation," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(4), pages 358-369, November.
    3. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    4. Johansson, Per & Nilsson, Jan-Eric, 2004. "An economic analysis of track maintenance costs," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 277-286, July.
    5. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
    6. S.J. Rassenti & V.L. Smith & R.L. Bulfin, 1982. "A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 402-417, Autumn.
    7. Brewer, Paul J. & Plott, Charles R., 1996. "A binary conflict ascending price (BICAP) mechanism for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 857-886, October.
    8. Ellis, Christopher J. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 1998. "British Bus Deregulation: Competition and Demand Coordination," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 336-361, May.
    9. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
    10. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ait Ali, Abderrahman & Warg, Jennifer & Eliasson, Jonas, 2020. "Pricing commercial train path requests based on societal costs," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 452-464.
    2. Nash, Chris & Coulthard, Simon & Matthews, Bryan, 2004. "Rail track charges in Great Britain--the issue of charging for capacity," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 315-327, October.
    3. Stojadinović, Nikola & Bošković, Branislav & Trifunović, Dejan & Janković, Slađana, 2019. "Train path congestion management: Using hybrid auctions for decentralized railway capacity allocation," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 123-139.
    4. Link, Heike & Nilsson, Jan-Eric, 2005. "Infrastructure," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-83, January.
    5. Perennes, Patricia, 2014. "Use of combinatorial auctions in the railway industry: Can the “invisible hand” draw the railway timetable?," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 175-187.
    6. Jansson, Kjell & Lang, Harald, 2013. "Rail infrastructure charging EU-directive, Swedish concerns and theory," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 285-293.
    7. Broman, Emanuel & Eliasson, Jonas, 2019. "Welfare effects of open access competition on railway markets," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 72-91.

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