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How Macroeconomists Lost Control of Stabilization Policy: Towards Dark Ages

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  • Jean-Bernard Chatelain

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Kirsten Ralf

    (INSEEC - Institut des hautes études économiques et commerciales | School of Business and Economics, ESCE – International Business School)

Abstract

This paper is a study of the history of the transplant of mathematical tools using negative feedback for macroeconomic stabilization policy from 1948 to 1975 and the subsequent break of the use of control for stabilization policy which occurred from 1975 to 1993. New-classical macroeconomists selected a subset of the tools of control that favored their support of rules against discretionary stabilization policy. The Lucas critique and Kydland and Prescott's time-inconsistency were overstatements that led to the "dark ages" of the prevalence of the stabilization-policy-ineffectiveness idea. These overstatements were later revised following the success of the Taylor (1993) rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "How Macroeconomists Lost Control of Stabilization Policy: Towards Dark Ages," PSE Working Papers halshs-02978527, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-02978527
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02978527
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "Policy Maker’s Credibility with Predetermined Instruments for Forward-Looking Targets," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 823-846.
    2. Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2021. "Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 72(1), pages 43-63.
    3. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2021. "Hopf Bifurcation From New-Keynesian Taylor Rule To Ramsey Optimal Policy," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(8), pages 2204-2236, December.
    4. Francisco Louçã & Alexandre Abreu & Gonçalo Pessa Costa, 2021. "Disarray at the headquarters: Economists and Central bankers tested by the subprime and the COVID recessions [Forward guidance without common knowledge]," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 30(2), pages 273-296.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Control; Stabilization Policy Ineffectiveness; Negative feedback; Dynamic Games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B22 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Macroeconomics
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • C36 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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