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Ramsey Optimal Policy versus Multiple Equilibria with Fiscal and Monetary Interactions

Author

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  • Jean-Bernard Chatelain

    (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Kirsten Ralf

    (Ecole Supérieure du Commerce Extérieur - ESCE - International business school)

Abstract

We consider a frictionless constant endowment economy based on Leeper (1991). In this economy, it is shown that, under an ad-hoc monetary rule and an ad-hoc fiscal rule, there are two equilibria. One has active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy, while the other has passive monetary policy and active fiscal policy. We consider an extended setup in which the policy maker minimizes a loss function under quasi-commitment, as in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007). Under this formulation there exists a unique Ramsey equilibrium, with an interest rate peg and a passive fiscal policy. We thank John P. Conley, Luis de Araujo and one referree for their very helpful comments.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "Ramsey Optimal Policy versus Multiple Equilibria with Fiscal and Monetary Interactions," Post-Print hal-02471593, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02471593
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02471593
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, 2014. "Monetary Regime Switches and Central Bank Preferences," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(8), pages 1591-1626, December.
    2. Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2021. "Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 72(1), pages 43-63.
    3. Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2019. "A Simple Algorithm for Solving Ramsey Optimal Policy with Exogenous Forcing Variables," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2429-2440.
    4. John H. Cochrane, 2011. "Determinacy and Identification with Taylor Rules," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 565-615.
    5. Leeper, Eric M., 1991. "Equilibria under 'active' and 'passive' monetary and fiscal policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 129-147, February.
    6. Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2019. "A Simple Algorithm for Solving Ramsey Optimal Policy with Exogenous Forcing Variables," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2429-2440.
    7. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2022. "Ramsey Optimal Policy In The New-Keynesian Model With Public Debt," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(6), pages 1588-1614, September.
    8. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kahn, Charles M, 1980. "The Solution of Linear Difference Models under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(5), pages 1305-1311, July.
    9. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
    10. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1978. "Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1429-1445, November.
    11. Bai, Yuting & Leeper, Eric M., 2017. "Fiscal stabilization vs. passivity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 105-108.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2019. "A Simple Algorithm for Solving Ramsey Optimal Policy with Exogenous Forcing Variables," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 39(4), pages 2429-2440.
    2. Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "How macroeconomists lost control of stabilization policy: towards dark ages," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(6), pages 938-982, November.
    3. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2020. "The Welfare of Ramsey Optimal Policy Facing Auto-Regressive Shocks," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 40(2), pages 1797-1803.
    4. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2022. "Ramsey Optimal Policy In The New-Keynesian Model With Public Debt," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(6), pages 1588-1614, September.
    5. Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "Policy Maker’s Credibility with Predetermined Instruments for Forward-Looking Targets," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 823-846.
    6. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2021. "Hopf Bifurcation From New-Keynesian Taylor Rule To Ramsey Optimal Policy," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(8), pages 2204-2236, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Interest Rate Rule; Frictionless endowment economy; Fiscal theory of the Price Level; Ramsey optimal policy; Fiscal Rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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