Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities

This paper uses French data to simultaneously estimate the impact of two types of connections on government subsidies allocated to municipalities. Investigating different types of connection in a same setting helps to distinguish between the different motivations that could drive pork-barreling. We differentiate between municipalities where ministers held office before their appointment to the government and those where they lived as children. Exploiting ministers' entries into and exits from the government, we show that municipalities where a minister was mayor receive 30% more investment subsidies when the politician they are linked to joins the government, and a similar size decrease when the minister departs. In contrast, we do not observe these outcomes for municipalities where ministers lived as children. These findings indicate that altruism toward childhood friends and family does not fuel pork-barreling, and suggest that altruism toward adulthood social relations or career concerns matter. We also present complementary evidence suggesting that observed porkbarreling is the result of soft influence of ministers, rather than of their formal control over the administration they lead.✩ This paper was previously circulated under the titles ''What motivates French pork: Political career concerns or private connections?'' and ''The returns from private and political connections: New evidence from French municipalities''. We greatly appreciated comments and suggestions from three anonymous reviewers, the Editor,