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Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage

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  • Kartik, Navin
  • Van Weelden, Richard

Abstract

We study dynamic models of electoral accountability. Politicians' policy preferences are their private information, so officeholders act to influence the electorate's beliefs — i.e., to build reputation — and improve their re-election prospects. The resulting behavior may be socially desirable ( good reputation effects ) or undesirable ( bad reputation effects ). When newly-elected officeholders face stronger reputation pressures than their established counterparts, good reputation effects give rise to incumbency disadvantage, while bad reputation effects induce incumbency advantage, all else equal. We relate these results to empirical patterns on incumbency effects across democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Kartik, Navin & Van Weelden, Richard, 2019. "Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 14(2), pages 131-157, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00016057
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00016057
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    Cited by:

    1. Jeremy Bowles & Benjamin Marx, 2022. "Turnover and Accountability in Africa's Parliaments," Working Papers hal-03873800, HAL.
    2. Merzoni, Guido & Trombetta, Federico, 2022. "Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 132-143.
    3. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "Electoral Imbalances and their Consequences," MPRA Paper 68650, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Nov 2015.
    4. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Daiki Kishishita, 2020. "Collective Reputation and Learning in Political Agency Problems," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1110, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    5. repec:hal:ipppap:halshs-04687331 is not listed on IDEAS

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