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Nouvelles conditions de travail : satisfaction ou résignation ?

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  • Marie Claire Villeval

    (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

L'analyse des conditions de travail en relation avec les modes d'organisation du travail a longtemps été l'apanage des sociologues, psychologues, ergonomes et gestionnaires plus que des économistes du travail. Si en dehors des grands auteurs classiques, les économistes se sont intéressés plus récemment que les chercheurs d'autres disciplines aux questions relatives aux conditions de travail, ce n'est nullement parce que la science économique n'offre pas les outils d'analyse pertinents. La recherche de modes efficients d'allocation et de mobilisation des ressources passe nécessairement par l'analyse de la façon dont le travail est organisé, exercé, valorisé ou subi. Mais il est vrai que les économistes du travail se sont longtemps intéressés davantage aux marchés externes qu'aux marchés internes du travail (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Les développements de la théorie des jeux non coopératifs et de l'analyse des asymétries d'information et des incitations ont fait évoluer l'économie du travail vers l' « économie des ressources humaines » comme elle a fait basculer l'économie industrielle vers l' « organisation industrielle »L'analyse des conditions de travail en relation avec les modes d'organisation du travail a longtemps été l'apanage des sociologues, psychologues, ergonomes et gestionnaires plus que des économistes du travail. Si en dehors des grands auteurs classiques, les économistes se sont intéressés plus récemment que les chercheurs d'autres disciplines aux questions relatives aux conditions de travail, ce n'est nullement parce que la science économique n'offre pas les outils d'analyse pertinents. La recherche de modes efficients d'allocation et de mobilisation des ressources passe nécessairement par l'analyse de la façon dont le travail est organisé, exercé, valorisé ou subi. Mais il est vrai que les économistes du travail se sont longtemps intéressés davantage aux marchés externes qu'aux marchés internes du travail (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Les développements de la théorie des jeux non coopératifs et de l'analyse des asymétries d'information et des incitations ont fait évoluer l'économie du travail vers l' « économie des ressources humaines » comme elle a fait basculer l'économie industrielle vers l' « organisation industrielle » (Malgrange, Rulliere et Villeval, 2004). De nouvelles perspectives se sont ouvertes avec la constitution depuis les années quatre-vingts d'un nouveau champ défini comme « l'économie des ressources humaines » . De nouvelles perspectives se sont ouvertes avec la constitution depuis les années quatre-vingts d'un nouveau champ défini comme « l'économie des ressources humaines »

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  • Marie Claire Villeval, 2005. "Nouvelles conditions de travail : satisfaction ou résignation ?," Post-Print halshs-00157177, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00157177
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00157177
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    References listed on IDEAS

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