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Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game

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  • Vicente Calabuig
  • Gonzalo Olcina

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze if cooperation can be the product of cultural evolution in a two-stage coordination game, consisting of a production stage followed by a negotiation phase. We present an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences where the distribution of preferences in the population and the strategies are determined endogenously and simultaneously. There are several groups in the society; some of them play cooperatively and others do not. Socialization takes place inside the group, but there is a positive rate of migration among groups which parents anticipate. Our main result shows that all groups converge to the cooperative equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Vicente Calabuig & Gonzalo Olcina, 2009. "Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game," Post-Print hal-00698840, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00698840
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.005
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    Cited by:

    1. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William S., 2013. "Endogenous coordination and discoordination games: Multiculturalism and assimilation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 176-191.
    2. Hiller, Victor, 2011. "Work organization, preferences dynamics and the industrialization process," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 1007-1025.
    3. Garret Ridinger, 2018. "Cultural Transmission and Extortion," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-10, July.
    4. Xu, Yan & Hu, Bin & Wu, Jiang & Zhang, Jianhua, 2014. "Nonlinear analysis of the cooperation of strategic alliances through stochastic catastrophe theory," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 400(C), pages 100-108.
    5. Fabrizio Panebianco, 2016. "The role of persuasion in cultural evolution dynamics," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(3), pages 233-258, September.
    6. Panebianco, Fabrizio, 2014. "Socialization networks and the transmission of interethnic attitudes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 583-610.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    C78; D64; D63; Cultural Transmission; Coordination Game; Social Preferences; Cooperation; Migration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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