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Cultural integration and its discontents

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  • Kuran,T.
  • Sandholm,W.H.

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

Abstract

A community's culture is defined by the preferences and equilibrium behaviours of its members. Contacts among communities alter individual cultures through two interrelated mechanisms: behavioural adaptations driven by pay-offs to coordination, and preference changes shaped by socialization and self-persuasion. This paper explores the workings of these mechanisms through a model of cultural integration in which preferences and behaviours vary continuously. It identifies a broad set of conditions under which cross-cultural contacts promote cultural hybridization. The analysis suggests that policies to support social integration serve to homogenize preferences across communities, thereby undermining a key objective of multiculturalism. Yielding fresh insights into strategies pursued to influence cultural trends, it also shows that communities benefit from having other communities adjust their behaviours. Copyright 2008, Wiley-Blackwell.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Kuran,T. & Sandholm,W.H., 2002. "Cultural integration and its discontents," Working papers 20, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    • Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:200220
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