IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/inrvec/v63y2016i3d10.1007_s12232-016-0253-4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The role of persuasion in cultural evolution dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Fabrizio Panebianco

    (Bocconi University and IGIER)

Abstract

We analyze the evolution of a society in which types evolve not only depending on how much they are fit but also on how much they are able to persuade others about their fitness. This mechanism makes possible to reach equilibria not feasible under standard dynamics. We first provide necessary conditions for a generic matrix and generic class of cultural competition mechanisms in order to observe polymorphic equilibria, comparing it with the standard case. Then, necessary and sufficient conditions for polymorphic equilibrium stability are provided in the case of particular competition rule family, at each competition level. We show that some social dilemmas as prisoner’s dilemma or stag hunt can have their dynamics dramatically changed. We then analyze the prisoner’s dilemma framework finding that also full cooperation is sustainable in equilibrium. Finally we show that this persuasion mechanisms generally increase the equilibrium aggregate production of the society.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrizio Panebianco, 2016. "The role of persuasion in cultural evolution dynamics," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(3), pages 233-258, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:63:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s12232-016-0253-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s12232-016-0253-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12232-016-0253-4
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s12232-016-0253-4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00955369 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Calabuig, Vicente & Olcina, Gonzalo, 2009. "Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 188-201, October.
    3. Cordes, Christian & Richerson, Peter J. & Schwesinger, Georg, 2010. "How corporate cultures coevolve with the business environment: The case of firm growth crises and industry evolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 465-480, December.
    4. Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2002. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 28-53, April.
    5. Mengel, Friederike, 2008. "Matching structure and the cultural transmission of social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 608-623, September.
    6. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
    7. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation," Macroeconomics 0409026, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Luigino Bruni & Fabrizio Panebianco & Alessandra Smerilli, 2014. "Beyond Carrots and Sticks: How Cooperation and Its Rewards Evolve Together," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 72(1), pages 55-82, March.
    9. Bisin, Alberto & Verdier, Thierry, 2001. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 298-319, April.
    10. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, April.
    11. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2006. "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 23-48, Spring.
    12. Ken Binmore, 2006. "Why do people cooperate?," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 5(1), pages 81-96, February.
    13. repec:hhs:iuiwop:487 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Cordes, Christian & Richerson, Peter J. & McElreath, Richard & Strimling, Pontus, 2008. "A naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm: The role of cooperation and cultural evolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 125-139, October.
    15. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition," IEW - Working Papers 084, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    16. Guido Tabellini, 2008. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(3), pages 905-950.
    17. Concepción Peñarrubia & Gonzalo Olcina, 2002. "Specific investments and coordination failures," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(2), pages 1-7.
    18. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    19. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2002. "Why Social Preferences Matter -- The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 1-33, March.
    20. Alberto Bisin & Giorgio Topa & Thierry Verdier, 2004. "Cooperation as a Transmitted Cultural Trait," Rationality and Society, , vol. 16(4), pages 477-507, November.
    21. Herbert Gintis, 2003. "Solving the Puzzle of Prosociality," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(2), pages 155-187, May.
    22. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Calabuig, Vicente & Olcina, Gonzalo, 2009. "Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 188-201, October.
    2. Francesco Giavazzi & Ivan Petkov & Fabio Schiantarelli, 2019. "Culture: persistence and evolution," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 117-154, June.
    3. Anders Poulsen & Odile Poulsen, 2006. "Endogenous Preferences and Social-Dilemma Institutions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(4), pages 627-660, December.
    4. Michal Bauer & Julie Chytilová & Barbara Pertold-Gebicka, 2014. "Parental background and other-regarding preferences in children," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 24-46, March.
    5. van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M. & Gowdy, John M., 2009. "A group selection perspective on economic behavior, institutions and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 1-20, October.
    6. Abhijit Ramalingam & Michael T. Rauh, 2010. "The Firm as a Socialization Device," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(12), pages 2191-2206, December.
    7. Timothy Besley, 2013. "What's the Good of the Market? An Essay on Michael Sandel's What Money Can't Buy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(2), pages 478-495, June.
    8. Della Lena, Sebastiano & Manzoni, Elena & Panebianco, Fabrizio, 2023. "On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 765-793.
    9. Safarzynska, Karolina & van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2010. "Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 743-752, February.
    10. Panebianco, Fabrizio, 2014. "Socialization networks and the transmission of interethnic attitudes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 583-610.
    11. Christian Cordes, 2019. "The promises of a naturalistic approach: how cultural evolution theory can inform (evolutionary) economics," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 1241-1262, September.
    12. Garret Ridinger, 2018. "Cultural Transmission and Extortion," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-10, July.
    13. Vasileios Kotsidis, 2018. "Call to Action: Intrinsic Motives and Material Interests," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-24, November.
    14. Heineck, Guido & Süssmuth, Bernd, 2013. "A different look at Lenin’s legacy: Social capital and risk taking in the Two Germanies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 789-803.
    15. Engelhardt, Sebastian v. & Freytag, Andreas, 2013. "Institutions, culture, and open source," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 90-110.
    16. Maystre, Nicolas & Olivier, Jacques & Thoenig, Mathias & Verdier, Thierry, 2014. "Product-based cultural change: Is the village global?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 212-230.
    17. Guido Tabellini, 2007. "The Scope of Cooperation: Norms and Incentives," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000866, David K. Levine.
    18. Wenyuan Liu & Ting Ren, 2021. "Family ties and employment behavior: The role of financial intermediaries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 48-75, February.
    19. Holden, Stein T. & Tilahun, Mesfin, 2019. "How Do Social Preferences and Norms of Reciprocity affect Generalized and Particularized Trust?," CLTS Working Papers 8/19, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Centre for Land Tenure Studies, revised 10 Oct 2019.
    20. Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cultural evolution; Cultural transmission; Evolutionary selection; Cooperation; Prisoner’s dilemma;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:63:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s12232-016-0253-4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.