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The Demographic Transition and the Position of Women: A Marriage Market Perspective

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  • Bhaskar, Venkataraman

Abstract

We present international evidence on the marriage market implications of cohort size growth, and set out a theoretical model of how marriage markets adjust to imbalances. Since men marry younger women, secular growth in cohort size worsens the position of women. This effect has been substantial in many Asian countries, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Secular decline in cohort sizes, as is happening in East Asia, improves the position of women. We show that the age gap at marriage will not adjust in order to equilibrate the marriage market in response to persistent imbalances, even though it accommodates transitory shocks. This is true under transferable utility even if age preferences are relatively minor, as well as under non-transferable utility. We examine the distributional consequences on the sexes, and on dowry payments.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhaskar, Venkataraman, 2015. "The Demographic Transition and the Position of Women: A Marriage Market Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 10619, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10619
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bhalotra, Sonia & Chakravarty, Abhishek & Gulesci, Selim, 2020. "The price of gold: Dowry and death in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    2. Michael Geruso & Heather Royer, 2018. "The Impact of Education on Family Formation: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the UK," NBER Working Papers 24332, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Zaki Wahhaj, 2015. "A Theory of Child Marriage," Studies in Economics 1520, School of Economics, University of Kent.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dowry; Sex ratio; Marriage markets; Marriage squeeze; Stable matching;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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