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Application of methods used in the classical matching markets to the Indian marriage market

Author

Listed:
  • Raïssa-Juvette Samba

    (UMNG - Université Marien-Ngouabi [Université de Brazzaville] = Marien Ngouabi University [University of Brazzaville])

  • Rhonya Adli

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In most societies, the social practice of paying dowry tends to decline and sometimes to disappear. In contrast, a system of marriages negotiated between families continues to exist in India; a marriage squeeze and a real dowry inflation are observed throughout the country. This paper brings a nice application of methods used in the classical matching markets: existence of stable outcomes and a minimum equilibrium dowry, coincidence between the set of stable outcomes and the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes. We further discuss strategic questions and address issues comparative statics when a marriage squeeze yields in the Indian marriage market.

Suggested Citation

  • Raïssa-Juvette Samba & Rhonya Adli, 2015. "Application of methods used in the classical matching markets to the Indian marriage market," Working Papers halshs-01180569, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01180569
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01180569
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rao, Vijayendra, 1993. "The Rising Price of Husbands: A Hedonic Analysis of Dowry Increases in Rural India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 666-677, August.
    2. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Bagnoli, Mark, 1993. "Courtship as a Waiting Game," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 185-202, February.
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    6. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-872, August.
    7. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2007. "Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 155-174, May.
    8. Francis Bloch & Vijayendra Rao, 2002. "Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1029-1043, September.
    9. Siwan Anderson, 2003. "Why Dowry Payments Declined with Modernization in Europe but Are Rising in India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(2), pages 269-310, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Dowry auction mechanism; Equilibrium stable outcome; Competitive equilibrium outcome; Population increase; Strategy-proof; Comparative statics JEL classification: C78; D78; J11; J12; D10;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • J11 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General

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