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How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework

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  • Aloysius Siow

Abstract

. The paper surveys the Choo and Siow (2006a; CS) marriage matching model and its extensions. CS derives a behavioural marriage‐matching function. The collective model of intra‐household allocations can be integrated into this framework. Spousal labour supplies respond to changing marriage market conditions. Marriage market tightness, the ratio of unmarried type i men to unmarried type j women is a sufficient statistic for marriage market conditions for those types of individuals. The hypothesis that spousal labour supplies vary to equilibrate the marriage market has overidentifying restrictions. The framework extends to a dynamic marriage‐matching environment. Empirically, this paper shows how the famine caused by the great leap forward in Sichuan affected the marital behaviour of famine‐born cohorts. Marriage market tightness is shown to be a useful statistic for summarizing marriage market conditions in the United States. Marriage market conditions in the contemporary United States primarily affect spousal labour force participation rather than hours of work. Ce texte examine le modèle de Choo et Siow et ses extensions. Ce modèle dérive une fonction comportemental d'arrimage sur le marché du mariage. Le modèle d'allocation intra‐ménage des tâches peut s'intégrer à ce cadre d'analyse. Les offres de travail des époux répondent aux conditions changeantes du marché du mariage. Un marché du mariage serré, un ratio d'hommes célibataires de type i par rapport à un nombre de femmes célibataires de type j constitue une statistique suffisante pour établir les conditions de marché de ces types d'individus. L'hypothèse que les offres de travail des époux varient pour équilibrer le marché du mariage engendre des restrictions de sur‐identification. Le cadre d'analyse couvre le cas d'un environnement dynamique d'arrimage. Empiriquement, ce mémoire montre comment la famine causée par le grand saut en avant de Sichuan a affecté le comportement de mariage des cohortes qui en sort sorties. On montre aussi que le caractère serré du marché du mariage aux Etats‐Unis fournit une statistique utile pour prendre le pouls des conditions du marché du mariage. Ces conditions dans le monde contemporain aux Etats‐Unis ont un impact sur la participation des époux au marché du travail plutôt que sur les heures travaillées.

Suggested Citation

  • Aloysius Siow, 2008. "How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(4), pages 1121-1155, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:41:y:2008:i:4:p:1121-1155
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00498.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maristella Botticini & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Are There Increasing Returns in Marriage Markets?," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-050, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    2. Ermisch, John & Ogawa, Naohiro (ed.), 1994. "The Family, the Market, and the State in Ageing Societies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288183.
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    9. Aloysius Siow & Eugene Choo, 2007. "Lifecycle marriage matching: Theory and Evidence," 2007 Meeting Papers 550, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    11. Loren Brandt & Aloysius Siow & Carl Vogel, 2008. "Large Shocks and Small Changes in the Marriage Market for Famine Born Cohorts in China," Working Papers tecipa-334, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    12. Gillian Hamilton & Aloysius Siow, 2007. "Class, Gender and Marriage," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(4), pages 549-575, October.
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    17. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2002. "Competing Premarital Investments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 592-608, June.
    18. Aloysius Siow, 1998. "Differential Fecundity, Markets, and Gender Roles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(2), pages 334-354, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Jaerim Choi, 2021. "Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(2), pages 473-509, September.
    3. Decker, Colin & Lieb, Elliott H. & McCann, Robert J. & Stephens, Benjamin K., 2013. "Unique equilibria and substitution effects in a stochastic model of the marriage market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 778-792.
    4. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow, 2008. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," Working Papers tecipa-340, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    5. Alpern, Steve & Katrantzi, Ioanna & Ramsey, David, 2014. "Equilibrium population dynamics when mating is by mutual choice based on age," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 63-72.
    6. Katja Maria Kaufmann & Matthias Messner & Alex Solis, 2013. "Returns to Elite Higher Education in the Marriage Market: Evidence from Chile," Working Papers 489, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    7. Bautista Lacambra, Sergio, 2020. "Household labor supply: Collective results for certain developed countries," MPRA Paper 101514, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Aloysius Siow, 2015. "Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 409-441.
    9. Liang Chen & Eugene Choo & Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2021. "Matching Function Equilibria with Partial Assignment: Existence, Uniqueness and Estimation," Working Papers hal-03936296, HAL.
    10. Kenneth Burdett & Mei Dong & Ling Sun & Randall Wright, 2016. "Marriage, Markets, And Money: A Coasian Theory Of Household Formation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(2), pages 337-368, May.
    11. Dapeng Zhang & Xiaokun (Cara) Wang, 2020. "Investigation of Freight Agents’ Interaction Considering Partner Selection and Joint Decision Making," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(9), pages 1-15, May.
    12. Seul-Ki Shin, 2014. "Preferences vs. Opportunities: Racial/Ethnic Intermarriage in the United States," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-040, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    13. Alfred Galichon & Scott Kominers & Simon Weber, 2014. "An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Working Papers hal-03460155, HAL.
    14. Zhang, Dapeng & (Cara) Wang, Xiaokun, 2018. "Understanding many-to-many matching relationship and its correlation with joint response," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 249-260.
    15. J. Emery & Ana Ferrer, 2009. "Marriage market imbalances and labor force participation of Canadian women," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 43-57, March.
    16. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow, 2008. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," Working Papers tecipa-340, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    17. Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2024. "Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Papers 2403.05222, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.

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