Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
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- Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2002. "Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-149, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Nov 2004.
- Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2003. "Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Economics Working Papers 0030, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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