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Federal Marketing Orders for Fruits, Vegetables, Nuts, and Specialty Crops

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  • Powers, Nicholas J.

Abstract

Many marketing orders have regulations for funding promotion and research and establishing package, container, grade, and size requirements. The intent of these regulations is to increase sales by increasing buyer awareness of the product, developing more desirable products, and reducing marketing costs. A few marketing orders control the volume of produce entering certain markets and are intended to even out supplies and prices over time. These regulations can restrict sales of high-quality produce to the fresh-use market and boost farm prices for a given quantity. However, production increases stimulated by the higher prices subsequently reduce them.

Suggested Citation

  • Powers, Nicholas J., 1990. "Federal Marketing Orders for Fruits, Vegetables, Nuts, and Specialty Crops," Agricultural Economic Reports 308137, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uerser:308137
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.308137
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Epperson, James E. & Huang, Wan-Tran, 1992. "The Potential For Intraseasonal Market Flow Management Of Southeastern Sweet Potatoes," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 23(2), pages 1-8, June.
    2. Hennessy, David A., 1996. "Information Asymmetry As a Reason for Vertical Integration," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10422, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    3. Paul M. Romer, 1993. "Implementing a National Technology Strategy with Self-Organizing Industry Investment Boards," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(2 Microec), pages 345-399.
    4. Elizabeth Hoffman & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "Political Bargaining and Cartelization in the New Deal: Orange Marketing Orders," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 189-222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Kachel, Yael & Finkelshtain, Israel, 2010. "A Comparative Analysis of Antitrust Regulations in the Agricultural Sector in Israel, the US and the EU," Journal of Rural Cooperation, Hebrew University, Center for Agricultural Economic Research, vol. 38(01), pages 1-35.
    6. Sharon Raszap Skorbiansky & Suzanne Thornsbury & Anne Effland, 2022. "Specialty crops and the farm bill," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(3), pages 1241-1260, September.

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