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Reassessing marketing boards as hybrid arrangements: evidence from Canadian experiences

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  • Annie Royer
  • Claude Ménard
  • Daniel-Mercier Gouin

Abstract

In this article, we reassess the role of marketing boards and similar arrangements that have played an important role in numerous agro-food sectors of developed countries over almost a century. Referring to transaction cost economics and to more recent contributions on the allocation of decision and property rights, we interpret these arrangements as hybrid modes of governance. We hypothesize that uncertainty is the leading force pushing toward these organizational solutions and we explore forms of uncertainty at stake and their impact in shaping various types of hybrids. We also explore the role of institutional embeddedness in providing marketing boards and the like their legitimacy. Using numerous examples from Canadian marketing boards, we discuss the benefits and point out flaws of these arrangements. We conclude on the need to assess comparatively the role of these solutions with respect to, for example, a system of bilateral contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Annie Royer & Claude Ménard & Daniel-Mercier Gouin, 2016. "Reassessing marketing boards as hybrid arrangements: evidence from Canadian experiences," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 47(1), pages 105-116, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:agecon:v:47:y:2016:i:1:p:105-116
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/agec.12213
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    2. Didier Raboisson & Ahmed Ferchiou & Tifenn Corre & Sylvain Perez & Pierre Sans & Guillaume Lhermie & Marie Dervillé, 2021. "Could Contracts between Pharmaceutical Firms and French Veterinarians Bias Prescription Behaviour: A Principal-Agency Theory Approach in the Context of Oligopolies," Post-Print hal-03148045, HAL.
    3. Xiaoying Li & Qinghua Zhu, 2020. "Contract Design for Enhancing Green Food Material Production Effort with Asymmetric Supply Cost Information," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(5), pages 1-18, March.
    4. Gaetano Martino & Daniela Toccaceli & Alessandro Pacciani & Michela Ascani, 2019. "The Interbranch organizations in the cap reform: Institutional nature, opportunities and limits," Economia agro-alimentare, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 21(2), pages 315-334.
    5. Claude Ménard & Gaetano Martino & Gustavo Magalhães de Oliveira & Annie Royer & Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes & Paula Sarita Bigio Schnaider, 2022. "Governing food safety through meso‐institutions: A cross‐country analysis of the dairy sector," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(4), pages 1722-1741, December.
    6. Rouvière, Elodie & Royer, Annie, 2017. "Public Private Partnerships in food industries: A road to success?," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 135-144.
    7. Stefano Ciliberti & Gaetano Martino & Angelo Frascarelli & Gabriele Chiodini, 2019. "Contractual arrangements in the Italian durum wheat supply chain: The impacts of the "Fondo grano duro"," Economia agro-alimentare, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 21(2), pages 235-254.

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