IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/ejlwec/v25y2008i1p79-94.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Uncertainty and regulatory outcome in the Swedish electricity distribution sector

Author

Listed:
  • Magnus Söderberg

Abstract

Regulatory agencies are potentially influenced by market characteristics and underlying incentives and use simplifying decision rules. When decision uncertainty increases, it is hypothesised that these influences become more apparent. This study investigates civil cases initiated by dissatisfied customers in the Swedish electricity distribution market. The purpose is to determine (1) how regulatory decision uncertainty manifests itself and (2) whether multi-echelon regulatory structure has a structural impact on regulatory outcome. The results indicate that the regulator's decisions exhibit status quo bias and that large customers are privileged compared to small customers. The court distinguishes itself by favouring large utilities.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Magnus Söderberg, 2008. "Uncertainty and regulatory outcome in the Swedish electricity distribution sector," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 79-94, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:25:y:2008:i:1:p:79-94
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-007-9040-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-007-9040-8
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10657-007-9040-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Spitzer, Matt & Talley, Eric, 2000. "Judicial Auditing," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 649-683, June.
    2. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    3. Geoff Edwards & Leonard Waverman, 2006. "The Effects of Public Ownership and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 23-67, January.
    4. Spiller, Pablo T, 1996. "Institutions and Commitment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 5(2), pages 421-452.
    5. Luce, Mary Frances, 1998. "Choosing to Avoid: Coping with Negatively Emotion-Laden Consumer Decisions," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 24(4), pages 409-433, March.
    6. Inman, J.J. & Zeelenberg, M., 2002. "Regret in repeat purchase versus switching decisions : The attenuating role of decision justifiability," Other publications TiSEM 44060120-bd30-40e0-a97f-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Jost, Peter-J., 1997. "Regulatory enforcement in the presence of a court system," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 491-508, December.
    8. Klein, Christopher C. & H. Sweeney, George, 1999. "Regulator preferences and utility prices: evidence from natural gas distribution utilities," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-15, February.
    9. Inman, J Jeffrey & Zeelenberg, Marcel, 2002. "Regret in Repeat Purchase versus Switching Decisions: The Attenuating Role of Decision Justifiability," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 29(1), pages 116-128, June.
    10. Shavell, Steven, 1999. "The level of litigation: private versus social optimality of suit and of settlement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 99-115, March.
    11. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    12. Crew, Michael A & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 2002. "Regulatory Economics: Twenty Years of Progress?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 5-22, January.
    13. Garvie, Devon & Keeler, Andrew, 1994. "Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 141-162, September.
    14. Posner, Richard A, 1970. "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 365-419, October.
    15. Johnson, Paul E. & Jamal, Karim & Glen Berryman, R., 1989. "Audit judgment research," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 14(1-2), pages 83-99, January.
    16. Paul L. Joskow, 1989. "Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the Electrical Power Industry," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1989 Micr), pages 125-208.
    17. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    18. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-246, October.
    19. Laura I. Langbein, 2002. "Responsive bureaus, equity, and regulatory negotiation: an empirical view," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(3), pages 449-465.
    20. Meyer, Robert A & Leland, Hayne E, 1980. "The Effectiveness of Price Regulation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 62(4), pages 555-566, November.
    21. Becker, Elizabeth & Lindsay, Cotton M, 1994. "Does the Government Free Ride?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 277-296, April.
    22. Van de Ven, Wynand P. M. M. & Van Praag, Bernard M. S., 1981. "The demand for deductibles in private health insurance : A probit model with sample selection," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 229-252, November.
    23. Johannes M. Bauer, 2005. "Regulation and state ownership: conflicts and complementarities in eu telecommunications," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(2), pages 151-177, June.
    24. Shavell, Steven, 1996. "Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 493-501, June.
    25. Sam Peltzman, 1989. "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1989 Micr), pages 1-59.
    26. Jeremy Firestone, 2002. "Agency governance and enforcement: the influence of mission on environmental decisionmaking," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(3), pages 409-426.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Santolino & Magnus Söderberg, 2014. "Modelling appellate courts’ responses in motor injury disputes," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 393-407, December.
    2. Flavio Menezes & Magnus Söderberg & Miguel Santolino, 2012. "Regulatory behaviour under threat of court reversal," Discussion Papers Series 472, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    3. Magnus Söderberg, 2010. "Informal Benchmarks as a Source of Regulatory Threat in Unregulated Utility Sectors," CESifo Working Paper Series 2973, CESifo.
    4. Leroux, Anke & Söderberg, Magnus, 2023. "Network Regulation under electoral competition," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    5. Miguel Santolino & Magnus Söderberg, 2011. "The influence of decision-maker effort and case complexity on appealed rulings subject to multi-categorical selection," IREA Working Papers 201115, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Sep 2011.
    6. Magnus Söderberg & Makoto Tanaka, 2012. "Spatial price homogeneity as a mechanism to reduce the threat of regulatory intervention in locally monopolistic sectors," Working Papers hal-00659458, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    2. Tomaso Duso, 2005. "Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 251-276, March.
    3. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
    4. Mountain, Bruce R., 2019. "Ownership, regulation, and financial disparity: The case of electricity distribution in Australia," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-1.
    5. Spiller, Pablo T., 2013. "Transaction cost regulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 232-242.
    6. Reuben Gronau, 2007. "Regulation—the corridor to liberalization: the experience of the Israeli phone market 1984–2005," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 287-311, December.
    7. didier chabaud & Parthenay Claude & Yannick Perez, 2005. "Environnement institutionnel et trajectoire des entreprises : une analyse northienne de l’industrie électrique," Post-Print hal-04297605, HAL.
    8. Patricia H. Born & E. Tice Sirmans, 2019. "Regret in health insurance post‐purchase behavior," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(2), pages 207-219, July.
    9. James W. Hughes & Michael J. Moore & Edward A. Snyder, 2002. ""Napsterizing" Pharmaceuticals: Access, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare," NBER Working Papers 9229, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Alejandro Castaneda, 2020. "Cronies, Rents, and Import Licenses: Non-tariff Trade Controls throughout Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in Mexico," Tiempo y Economía, Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano, vol. 7(2), pages 90-118, July.
    11. Irja Vormedal & Lars H. Gulbrandsen & Jon Birger Skjærseth, 2020. "Big Oil and Climate Regulation: Business as Usual or a Changing Business?," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 20(4), pages 143-166, Autumn.
    12. Jayakar, Krishna & Martin, Brandie, 2012. "Regulatory governance in African telecommunications: Testing the resource curse hypothesis," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 691-703.
    13. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 729-770, September.
    14. Paul L. Joskow, 2014. "Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 291-344, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Russell Smyth & Magnus Söderberg, 2010. "Public interest versus regulatory capture in the Swedish electricity market," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 292-312, December.
    16. Till Bärnighausen & David Bloom, 2009. "Changing Research Perspectives on the Global Health Workforce," PGDA Working Papers 4609, Program on the Global Demography of Aging.
    17. Bickenbach, Frank, 1999. "Regulierung und Wettbewerb im Bereich der Netzinfrastrukturen: Begründung, Regeln und Institutionen," Kiel Working Papers 910, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    18. Cheng, Kuo-Tai, 2016. "Test of the mediating effects of regulatory decision tools in the communications regulator," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 277-289.
    19. Berg, Sanford V. & Jiang, Liangliang & Lin, Chen, 2012. "Regulation and corporate corruption: New evidence from the telecom sector," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 22-43.
    20. Sanjay Patnaik, 2019. "A cross-country study of collective political strategy: Greenhouse gas regulations in the European Union," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 50(7), pages 1130-1155, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Information; Electricity; Regression; C30; K23; K42; L51; L94;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C30 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - General
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:25:y:2008:i:1:p:79-94. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.