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Paul Pecorino

Personal Details

First Name:Paul
Middle Name:
Last Name:Pecorino
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ppe37
https://culverhouse.ua.edu/news/directory/paul-pecorino/
Department of Economics University of Alabama Box 870224 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
205-348-0379
Terminal Degree:1990 Department of Economics; Duke University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies
Culverhouse College of Business
University of Alabama-Tuscaloosa

Tuscaloosa, Alabama (United States)
https://efls.culverhouse.ua.edu/
RePEc:edi:defuaus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters

Working papers

  1. Cary Deck & Paul Pecorino & Michael Solomon, 2022. "Litigation with Negative Expected Value Suits: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 22-17, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  2. Sami Dakhlia & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Rent-seeking with scarce talent: a model of preemptive hiring," Microeconomics 0505002, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2024. "Proposal convergence and settlement under final offer arbitration," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
  2. Paul Pecorino, 2024. "Public good provision with redistributive taxation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 407-431, March.
  3. Cary Deck & Paul Pecorino & Michael Solomon, 2024. "Litigation with negative expected value suits: An experimental analysis," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 21(2), pages 244-278, June.
  4. Junsoo Lee & Paul Pecorino & Anne-Charlotte Souto, 2023. "A Comparison of the Female and Male Racial Disparities in Imprisonment," Journal of Economics, Race, and Policy, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 102-125, June.
  5. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2023. "Signaling in the “Before” Model of Final Offer Arbitration," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 521-556.
  6. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2022. "Discovery in a screening model of final offer arbitration," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  7. John R. Conlon & Paul Pecorino, 2022. "Public good provision with participation costs," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(2), pages 241-258, April.
  8. Pecorino, Paul & Solomon, Michael & Van Boening, Mark, 2021. "Bargaining with voluntary transmission of private information: An experimental analysis of final offer arbitration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 334-366.
  9. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2021. "Discovery and Disclosure in a Signaling Model of Final-Offer Arbitration," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(2), pages 407-443.
  10. Paul Pecorino, 2020. "Bridge burning and escape routes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 399-414, September.
  11. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2020. "Disclosure and Discovery with fairness," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
  12. Pecorino, Paul & Van Boening, Mark, 2019. "An empirical analysis of litigation with discovery: The role of fairness," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 172-184.
  13. Pecorino Paul & Van Boening Mark, 2019. "Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 1-32, July.
  14. Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening, 2018. "An Empirical Analysis of the Signaling and Screening Models of Litigation," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 20(1), pages 214-244.
  15. Paul Pecorino, 2018. "Supermajority rule, the law of 1/n, and government spending: a synthesis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 19-36, April.
  16. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2017. "Costly Voluntary Disclosure with Negative Expected Value Suits," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 19(2), pages 486-503.
  17. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2017. "Litigation with judgment proof defendants," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-9.
  18. William Hankins & Gary Hoover & Paul Pecorino, 2017. "Party polarization, political alignment, and federal grant spending at the state level," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 351-389, November.
  19. Farmer Amy & Pecorino Paul, 2016. "Litigation with a Variable Cost of Trial," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 203-226, July.
  20. Paul Pecorino, 2016. "Individual welfare and the group size paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 137-152, July.
  21. Paul Pecorino, 2016. "A Portion of Profits to Charity: Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Profitability," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(2), pages 380-398, October.
  22. Pecorino, Paul & Van Boening, Mark, 2015. "Costly voluntary disclosure in a screening game," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 16-28.
  23. Paul Pecorino, 2015. "Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 243-262, March.
  24. Farmer Amy & Pecorino Paul, 2014. "Litigation with Default Judgments," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 117-136, July.
  25. Pecorino Paul & Van Boening Mark, 2014. "Bargaining with Asymmetric Dispute Costs," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 31-58, March.
  26. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2013. "Discovery and Disclosure with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Expenditure at Trial," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 223-247.
  27. Paul Pecorino, 2013. "Monopolistic Competition and Public Good Provision with By‐product Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 875-893, December.
  28. Paul Pecorino, 2013. "Compensation for Regulatory Takings with a Redistributive Government," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(2), pages 488-501, October.
  29. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2012. "Lotteries, public good provision and the degree of rivalry," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(2), pages 195-202, April.
  30. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2012. "Title IX and the Allocation of Resources to Women's and Men's Sports," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 14(1), pages 141-164.
  31. Paul Pecorino, 2011. "Optimal Compensation for Regulatory Takings," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 13(1), pages 269-289.
  32. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2010. "Is the Coach Paid too Much?: Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 841-862, September.
  33. Pecorino, Paul, 2010. "By-product lobbying with rival public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 114-124, March.
  34. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2010. "Pretrial Bargaining with Asymmetric Information: Unilateral versus Bilateral Payoff Relevance," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 77(2), pages 369-384, October.
  35. Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening, 2010. "Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 263-287, May.
  36. Paul Pecorino, 2009. "Monopolistic Competition, Growth and Public Good Provision," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 298-307, January.
  37. Paul Pecorino, 2009. "Public goods, group size, and the degree of rivalry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 161-169, January.
  38. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2008. "The Group Size Paradox Revisited," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 785-799, October.
  39. Paul Pecorino, 2008. "Import Protection Bias," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 341-349, May.
  40. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2007. "Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 337-346, March.
  41. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2007. "Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 451-465, June.
  42. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2007. "Negative Expected Value Suits in a Signaling Model," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(2), pages 434-447, October.
  43. Paul Pecorino, 2006. "Rent Seeking: A Textbook Example," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(3), pages 331-339, July.
  44. Sami Dakhlia & Paul Pecorino, 2006. "Rent-seeking with scarce talent: A model of preemptive hiring," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 475-486, December.
  45. James Peery Cover & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Price and Output Stability under Price‐Level Targeting," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(1), pages 152-166, July.
  46. Amy Fanner & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Dispute Rates and Contingency Fees: An Analysis from the Signaling Model," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(3), pages 566-581, January.
  47. Gary Hoover & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 95-113, April.
  48. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Civil Litigation with Mandatory Discovery and Voluntary Transmission of Private Information," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 137-159, January.
  49. Cover, James P. & Pecorino, Paul, 2005. "The length of US business expansions: When did the break in the data occur?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 452-471, September.
  50. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul & Stango, Victor, 2004. "The Causes of Bargaining Failure: Evidence from Major League Baseball," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 543-568, October.
  51. Paul Pecorino, 2004. "Negotiation games: applying game theory to bargaining and arbitration, rev. ed., by Brams, S. J. Routledge advances in game theory, ed. by Schmidt, C., London and New York: Routledge, 2003, xxvi &plus," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(3), pages 175-176.
  52. John R. Conlon & Paul Pecorino, 2004. "Policy Reform and the Free-Rider Problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 120(1_2), pages 123-142, July.
  53. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2004. "Pretrial settlement with fairness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 287-296, July.
  54. Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening, 2004. "An Empirical Analysis of Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 131-156, January.
  55. Cover James Peery & Pecorino Paul, 2003. "Optimal Monetary Policy and the Correlation between Prices and Output," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, February.
  56. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2003. "Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information: Does the Use of Final Offer Arbitration Impede Settlement?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 64-82, April.
  57. Pecorino, Paul, 2002. "Should the US allow prescription drug reimports from Canada?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 699-708, July.
  58. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2002. "Pretrial bargaining with self-serving bias and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 163-176, June.
  59. Paul Pecorino, 2002. "Book Review," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 731-733, December.
  60. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2001. "A Note on the Theory of Charitable Fund‐raising: The Role of Refunds," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(3), pages 341-345, July.
  61. Pecorino, Paul, 2001. "Can by-product lobbying firms compete?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 377-397, December.
  62. Pecorino, Paul & Van Boening, Mark, 2001. "Bargaining and Information: An Empirical Analysis of A Multistage Arbitration Game," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(4), pages 922-948, October.
  63. Pecorino, Paul, 2001. "Market Structure, Tariff Lobbying and the Free-Rider Problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 203-220, March.
  64. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2000. "Does jury bias matter?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 315-328, September.
  65. Paul Pecorino, 1999. "Endogenous Export Subsidies as a Revenue-Seeking Activity: Some Implications for the Evolution of Protection," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(3), pages 785-798, May.
  66. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "Legal Expenditure as a Rent-Seeking Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 271-288, September.
  67. Basuchoudhary, Atin & Pecorino, Paul & Shughart, William F, II, 1999. "Reversal of Fortune: The Politics and Economics of the Superconducting Supercollider," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 185-201, September.
  68. Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-134, April.
  69. Conlon, John R & Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Primary and Secondary Reform," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 590-602, October.
  70. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Bargaining with Informative Offers: An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 415-432, June.
  71. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Errata [Exogenous Tariff Changes with an Endogenous Lobbying Response]," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1-2), pages 221-221, January.
  72. Paul Pecorino, 1998. "The Response to Reform in a Growing Economy: The Role of Rent‐Seeking Technology," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 167-180, June.
  73. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "A reputation for being a nuisance: frivolous lawsuits and fee shifting in a repeated play game," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 147-157, June.
  74. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 652-660, June.
  75. Pecorino, Paul, 1997. "The Optimal Rate of Inflation When Capital is Taxed," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 657-673, October.
  76. Pecorino, Paul, 1997. "Exogenous Tariff Changes with an Endogenous Lobbying Response," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 91-108, July.
  77. Pecorino, Paul, 1995. "Inflation, human capital accumulation and long-run growth," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 533-542.
  78. Pecorino, Paul, 1995. "Tax rates and tax revenues in a model of growth through human capital accumulation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 527-539, December.
  79. Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "The Growth Rate Effects of Tax Reform," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 492-501, July.
  80. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 273-281, September.
  81. Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "Taxation, growth and competitiveness in a two-country mode," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 295-311.
  82. Amy Farmer Curry & Paul Pecorino, 1993. "The Use of Final Offer Arbitration as a Screening Device," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 655-669, December.
  83. Pecorino, Paul, 1993. "Tax structure and growth in a model with human capital," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 251-271, September.
  84. Pual Pecorino, 1992. "Rent Seeking and Growth: The Case of Growth through Human Capital Accumulation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(4), pages 944-956, November.
    RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:3:y:2001:i:3:p:341-45 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:2:y:1998:i:2:p:167-80 is not listed on IDEAS

Chapters

  1. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 1999. "Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 379-396, Springer.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2005-05-14
  2. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2022-11-21
  3. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2022-11-21

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