Bridge burning and escape routes

Thomas Schelling (Arms and influence, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966) cites bridge burning as a method of commitment. While such a commitment can increase the chances of success in a conflict, it generally will lower one’s payoff if the conflict is lost. I use a contest framework and establish conditions under which such commitment can raise a player’s expected payoff. The comparative static effects of bridge burning never are favorable at an interior equilibrium, but the strategy may induce the opponent to concede the contest’s outcome. I also analyze the strategy, associated with Sun Tzu, of leaving an escape path open for one’s enemy. This strategy always succeeds at an interior equilibrium and raises the expected payoffs of both players. Under certain parameter restrictions, leaving an open escape path also has the potential of inducing the opponent to concede the contest. A special case of the model is offered to explain why a group vulnerable to a wealth transfer might prefer a less efficient tax system to a more efficient system.