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Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision

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  • PAUL PECORINO
  • AKRAM TEMIMI

Abstract

We analyze the effect of group size on public good provision under the Morgan (2000) lottery mechanism. For a pure public good, the lottery performs quite well as public good provision is found to increase in group size, even when the lottery prize is held constant. By contrast, for fully rival public goods, per capita provision is found to decrease in group size, even when the lottery prize is proportional to group size. Further, the per capita level of provision will approach zero when group size is sufficiently large.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2007. "Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 451-465, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:3:p:451-465
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00314.x
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    1. repec:zbw:rwirep:0399 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Jindapon, Paan & Sujarittanonta, Pacharasut & Viriyavipart, Ajalavat, 2022. "Prize-linked savings games: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 202-229.
    3. John R. Conlon & Paul Pecorino, 2022. "Public good provision with participation costs," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(2), pages 241-258, April.
    4. Paul Pecorino, 2015. "Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 243-262, March.
    5. Christopher Oconnor & Li Zhang & Cary Deck, 2022. "An examination of the effect of inequality on lotteries for funding public goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(4), pages 733-755, August.
    6. Kent Grote & Victor Matheson, 2011. "The Economics of Lotteries: An Annotated Bibliography," Working Papers 1110, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    7. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2014. "On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: The two player case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 436-439.
    8. Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger, 2013. "On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0399, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    9. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2012. "Lotteries, public good provision and the degree of rivalry," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(2), pages 195-202, April.
    10. Paan Jindapon & Zhe Yang, 2020. "Free riders and the optimal prize in public‐good funding lotteries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1289-1312, September.
    11. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2013. "On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Ruhr Economic Papers 399, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    12. Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April.

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