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By-product lobbying with rival public goods

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  • Pecorino, Paul

Abstract

A by-product firm uses the profits from the sale of a private good to finance provision of a public good. If the public good exhibits any degree of rivalry, an increase in population will lead to a reduction in the provision of the public good, when the number of by-product firms is constant. An increase in the number of by-product firms raises provision of the public good, if population is constant. When population and the number of by-product firms are increased in the same proportion, the effect on provision of the public good depends upon the degree of rivalry exhibited by the public good.

Suggested Citation

  • Pecorino, Paul, 2010. "By-product lobbying with rival public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 114-124, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:1:p:114-124
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2010. "Contests with private costs: Beyond two players," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 558-567, December.

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