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Public goods, group size, and the degree of rivalry

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  • Paul Pecorino

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  • Paul Pecorino, 2009. "Public goods, group size, and the degree of rivalry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 161-169, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:138:y:2009:i:1:p:161-169
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9344-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2008. "Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 379-388, Springer.
    2. Borcherding, Thomas E & Deacon, Robert T, 1972. "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 891-901, December.
    3. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185, September.
    4. Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-134, April.
    5. Martin McGuire, 1974. "Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 107-126, June.
    6. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February.
    7. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
    8. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2008. "The Group Size Paradox Revisited," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 785-799, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Pecorino, 2015. "Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 243-262, March.
    2. Elias Asproudis, 2011. "Revisiting environmental groups and members’ behaviour: budget, size and (im)pure altruism," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 13(2), pages 139-156, June.
    3. David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2013. "Peer Discipline and the Strength of Organizations," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000000713, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2012. "Lotteries, public good provision and the degree of rivalry," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(2), pages 195-202, April.
    5. Liu, Weifeng Larry & Sandler, Todd, 2024. "Public goods, group size, and provision aggregation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 223(C), pages 146-167.
    6. Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2017. "Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 71-83.
    7. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Mondal, Debasis, 2014. "Group size paradox and public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 215-218.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods; Group size; Rivalry; Olson hypothesis; D7; H4;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

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