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Maxim Ivanov

Personal Details

First Name:Maxim
Middle Name:
Last Name:Ivanov
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:piv26
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/mivanov/
Terminal Degree:2008 Department of Economics; Pennsylvania State University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
McMaster University

Hamilton, Canada
http://www.mcmaster.ca/economics/
RePEc:edi:demcmca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022. "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 288-304.
  2. Maxim Ivanov, 2021. "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 955-1000, October.
  3. Ivanov Maxim, 2015. "Dynamic Information Revelation in Cheap Talk," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 251-275, July.
  4. Ivanov, Maxim, 2014. "Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 129-135.
  5. Maxim Ivanov, 2013. "Information revelation in competitive markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 337-365, January.
  6. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
  7. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.
  8. Ivanov, Maxim, 2009. "Niche market or mass market?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 217-220, December.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022. "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 288-304.

    Cited by:

    1. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).

  2. Maxim Ivanov, 2021. "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 955-1000, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
    2. Ozan Candogan & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver," Papers 2101.10431, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    3. Gu, Jiadong, 2023. "Optimal stress tests and liquidation cost," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    4. Teddy Mekonnen & Zeky Murra-Anton & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2023. "Persuaded Search," Papers 2303.13409, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
    5. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack & Mark Whitmeyer, 2024. "The Extreme Points of Fusions," Papers 2409.10779, arXiv.org.
    6. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.

  3. Ivanov Maxim, 2015. "Dynamic Information Revelation in Cheap Talk," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 251-275, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jan 2018.
    2. Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022. "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 288-304.
    3. Ichihashi, Shota, 2019. "Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 276-288.
    4. Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission," Working Papers 937, Barcelona School of Economics.
    5. Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
    6. Farzaneh Farhadi & Demosthenis Teneketzis, 2022. "Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 443-484, June.

  4. Ivanov, Maxim, 2014. "Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 129-135.

    Cited by:

    1. Alonso, Ricardo & Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "The art of brevity," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58681, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

  5. Maxim Ivanov, 2013. "Information revelation in competitive markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 337-365, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Armstrong, Mark & Zhou, Jidong, 2021. "Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition," MPRA Paper 108395, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Maxim Ivanov, 2021. "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 955-1000, October.
    3. Cristián Troncoso-Valverde, 2015. "Information Release in Second–Price Auctions," Serie Working Papers 15, Universidad del Desarrollo, School of Business and Economics.
    4. Chongwoo Choe & Noriaki Matsushima & Mark J. Tremblay, 2020. "Behavior-Based Personalized Pricing: When Firms Can Share Customer Information," ISER Discussion Paper 1083r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jul 2021.
    5. Christian Ewerhart, 2013. "Regular type distributions in mechanism design and $$\rho $$ -concavity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 591-603, August.
    6. Wu, Lingli & Deng, Shiming & Jiang, Xuan, 2018. "Sampling and pricing strategy under competition," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 192-208.
    7. Salvatore Piccolo & Aldo Pignataro, 2016. "Consumer Loss Aversion, Product Experimentation and Implicit Collusion," CSEF Working Papers 457, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    8. Peter Postl, 2011. "Efficiency versus Optimality in Procurement," Discussion Papers 11-03, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    9. Jean Guillaume Forand, 2012. "Competing Through Information Provision," Working Papers 1201, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2012.
    10. Jidong Zhou, 2021. "Mixed Bundling in Oligopoly Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2270, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    11. Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 94605, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Jeremy Bertomeu & Davide Cianciaruso, 2018. "Verifiable disclosure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 1011-1044, June.
    13. Lyu, Chen, 2023. "Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    14. Xianwen Shi & Jun Zhang, 2020. "Welfare of Price Discrimination and Market Segmentation in Duopoly," Working Papers tecipa-682, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    15. Wang, Chengsi, 2011. "Informative Advertising, Consumer Search and Transparency Policy," MPRA Paper 34977, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Andreas Blume & Oliver Board, 2009. "Intentional Vagueness," Working Paper 381, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised May 2009.
    17. Piccolo, Salvatore & Pignataro, Aldo, 2018. "Consumer loss aversion, product experimentation and tacit collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 49-77.
    18. Drugov, Mikhail & Troya Martinez, Marta, 2012. "Vague Lies: How to Advise Consumers When They Complain," CEPR Discussion Papers 9201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  6. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
    2. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2015. "Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication, and Reputational Concerns," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 109-149, November.
    3. Yingkai Li & Boli Xu, 2024. "Falsifiable Test Design in Coordination Games," Papers 2405.18521, arXiv.org.
    4. Maxim Ivanov, 2021. "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 955-1000, October.
    5. , & , M. & ,, 2013. "Hierarchical cheap talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    6. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2020. "Delegating performance evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    7. Ivanov Maxim, 2015. "Dynamic Information Revelation in Cheap Talk," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 251-275, July.
    8. Szalay, Dezső & Deimen, Inga, 2015. "Information, authority, and smooth communication in organizations," CEPR Discussion Papers 10969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Discussion Papers 2020/3, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    10. Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016. "Optimal sequential delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
    11. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2016. "Persuading Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3590-3605, November.
    12. Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022. "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 288-304.
    13. Eric Schmidbauer & Dmitry Lubensky, 2016. "Equilibrium Informativeness in Veto-Based Delegation," Working Papers 2016-03, University of Central Florida, Department of Economics.
    14. Rossella Argenziano & Sergei Severinov & Francesco Squintani, 2016. "Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 119-155, August.
    15. Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission," Working Papers 937, Barcelona School of Economics.
    16. Daniel Habermacher, 2022. "Information Aggregation in Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Working Papers 169, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    17. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Optimal Information Disclosure: Quantity vs. Quality," Discussion Papers 2013-19, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    18. Ball, Ian & Gao, Xin, 2024. "Benefiting from bias: Delegating to encourage information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    19. Foerster, Manuel & Habermacher, Daniel, 2023. "Policy-advising Competition and Endogenous Lobbies," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277613, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    20. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hao & Li, Wei, 2013. "Optimal limited authority for principal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2344-2382.
    21. Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming, 2019. "Ambiguous persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 312-365.
    22. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Experimental Design to Persuade," Discussion Papers 2013-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    23. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67950, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    24. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
    25. Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "A Smooth, strategic communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 479, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    26. Frug, Alexander, 2016. "A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 180-185.
    27. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    28. Nguyen, Anh & Tan, Teck Yong, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion with costly messages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    29. Daniel Habermacher, 2022. "Authority and Specialization under Informational Interdependence," Working Papers 142, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    30. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009. "Bayesian Persuasion," NBER Working Papers 15540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    31. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2009. "Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States," Discussion Papers 2009-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    32. Seung Han Yoo, 2016. "Organizational Design with Non-Contractible Quality," Discussion Paper Series 1604, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    33. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
    34. He Liu & Yun Bai & Zhiguang Huang & Han Qiao & Shouyang Wang, 2023. "Private banking development in China under two organizational structures: Economic analysis from an organizational innovation perspective," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 9(1), pages 1-23, December.
    35. Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, September.
    36. Harry Pei, 2020. "Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost," Papers 2006.08069, arXiv.org.
    37. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2014. "Persuading skeptics and reaffirming believers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58680, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    38. Anbarci, Nejat & Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Roy, Jaideep, 2017. "Information control in reputational cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 153-160.
    39. Pei, Harry Di, 2015. "Communication with endogenous information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 132-149.
    40. Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2022. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 199, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    41. Hedlund, Jonas, 2014. "Bayesian signaling," Working Papers 0577, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    42. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.

  7. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Münster, Johannes, 2011. "A strategic mediator who is biased into the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2011-012, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    2. Dmitry Sedov, 2023. "Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(3), pages 505-546, September.
    3. Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," MPRA Paper 45271, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Wei Li, 2010. "Peddling Influence through Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1136-1162, June.
    5. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique & Desrieux, Claudine, 2017. "Choosing ADR or litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 33-40.
    6. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 543-569, April.
    7. , & , M. & ,, 2013. "Hierarchical cheap talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    8. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators," Papers 2203.04285, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    9. Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2023. "Mediated talk: An experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    10. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
    11. Squintani, Francesco, 2024. "Persuasion in Networks," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1520, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    12. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
    13. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2005. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, revised Nov 2009.
    14. Lim, Wooyoung, 2014. "Communication in bargaining over decision rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 159-179.
    15. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jan 2018.
    16. Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.
    17. Squintani, Francesco, 2024. "Persuasion in Networks," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 88, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    18. Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022. "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 288-304.
    19. Ichihashi, Shota, 2019. "Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 276-288.
    20. Fox, Justin & Van Weelden, Richard, 2010. "Partisanship and the effectiveness of oversight," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 674-687, October.
    21. Migrow, Dimitri, 2018. "Designing Communication Hierarchies," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 44, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    22. Lu, Shih En, 2017. "Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 177-208.
    23. Omar A. Nayeem, 2017. "Bend Them but Don't Break Them: Passionate Workers, Skeptical Managers, and Decision Making in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 100-125, August.
    24. Eric Lavallee, 2016. "Mediation with near insolvent defaulting suppliers: a linear optimisation model to find an optimal outcome," Papers 1602.04466, arXiv.org.
    25. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
    26. Ivanov, Maxim, 2014. "Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 129-135.
    27. Iaryczower, Matias & Oliveros, Santiago, 2016. "Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 209-236.
    28. Alonso, Ricardo & Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "The art of brevity," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58681, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    29. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
    30. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Resisting Persuasion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 07-2017, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
      • Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 723-742, October.
    31. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2021. "Private vs. public communication: Difference of opinion and reputational concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    32. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hao & Li, Wei, 2013. "Optimal limited authority for principal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2344-2382.
    33. Miura, Shintaro, 2019. "Manipulated news model: Electoral competition and mass media," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 306-338.
    34. Sadakane, Hitoshi, 2023. "Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    35. Migrow, Dimitri, 2021. "Designing communication hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    36. Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert, 2012. "Due Diligence, Research Joint Ventures, and Incentives to Innovate," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(4), pages 588-611, December.
    37. Gregory Pavlov, 2013. "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20132, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    38. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Cheap talk about the detection probability," DICE Discussion Papers 90, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    39. Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    40. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.
    41. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Hitoshi Sadakane, 2020. "Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player," KIER Working Papers 1050, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    42. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas, 2018. "Noisy Persuasion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 11-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    43. Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & In-Uck Park, 2017. "Coordination of Humanitarian Aid," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 17/691, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    44. Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2019. "Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 356-380.
    45. Stepanov, Sergey, 2020. "Biased performance evaluation in a model of career concerns: incentives versus ex-post optimality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 589-607.
    46. Pinghan Liang, 2017. "Transfer of authority within hierarchies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 273-290, December.
    47. Lee, Yong-Ju & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhao, Chen, 2023. "Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 254-280.
    48. Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 114-144.
    49. Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
    50. Mark Whitmeyer, 2019. "Bayesian Elicitation," Papers 1902.00976, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    51. Lim, Wooyoung, 2012. "Selling authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 393-415.
    52. Edoardo Grillo, 2013. "Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 331, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    53. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro & Takagi, Yuki, 2013. "Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 103-115.

  8. Ivanov, Maxim, 2009. "Niche market or mass market?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 217-220, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Alexei Parahonyak & Nick Vikander, 2024. "Strategic Use of Product Delays to Shape Word-of-Mouth Communication," Economics Series Working Papers 1032, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Zhuoqiong Chen & Christopher Stanton & Catherine Thomas, 2024. "Information Spillovers in Experience Goods Competition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(6), pages 3923-3950, June.
    3. Thomas, Catherine & Chen, Zhuoqiong (Charlie) & Stanton, Christopher T., 2020. "Information Spillovers in Experience Goods Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 15255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Wang, Chengsi, 2011. "Informative Advertising, Consumer Search and Transparency Policy," MPRA Paper 34977, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Maxim Ivanov, 2013. "Information revelation in competitive markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 337-365, January.
    6. Chen, Zhuoqiong & Stanton, Christopher & Thomas, Catherine, 2024. "Information spillovers in experience goods competition," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120790, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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