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Communication via a strategic mediator

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  • Ivanov, Maxim

Abstract

This paper investigates communication between an informed expert and an uninformed principal via a strategic mediator. We demonstrate that, for any bias in the parties' preferences, there exists a strategic mediator that provides the highest expected payoff to the principal, as if the players had communicated through an optimal non-strategic mediator.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:2:p:869-884
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2008. "Costly Expertise," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 187-193, May.
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    5. Kydd, Andrew H., 2006. "When Can Mediators Build Trust?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(3), pages 449-462, August.
    6. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    7. , & , J. & ,, 2007. "Noisy talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(4), December.
    8. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
    9. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-1364, November.
    10. Andrew Kydd, 2003. "Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(4), pages 597-611, October.
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