Information Design in Cheap Talk
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Other versions of this item:
- Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2022. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," Papers 2207.04929, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
References listed on IDEAS
- Inga Deimen & Dezső Szalay, 2019.
"Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1349-1374, April.
- Szalay, Dezső & Deimen, Inga, 2018. "Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 12706, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
- Pei, Harry Di, 2015. "Communication with endogenous information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 132-149.
- Nguyen, Anh & Tan, Teck Yong, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion with costly messages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
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Cited by:
- Mark Whitmeyer & Kun Zhang, 2022. "Costly Evidence and Discretionary Disclosure," Papers 2208.04922, arXiv.org.
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More about this item
Keywords
Information design; cheap talk;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2022-10-31 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2022-10-31 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2022-10-31 (Microeconomics)
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