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Persuasion in Networks

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  • Squintani, Francesco

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

This paper brings together two major research streams in economic theory : information transmission in networks and strategic communication. The model embeds persuasion games of strategic disclosure by Milgrom (1981) into the communication network framework by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). I find that the unique optimal network is a line in which players are ordered according to their bliss points. This ordered line is also pairwise-stable. This finding stands in sharp contrast to previous results in network studies, that identify stars as the optimal and pairwise-stable networks when communication is non-strategic and subject to technological constraints. While stars are the most centralized minimally-connected networks, the line is the most decentralized one. These results may be especially relevant to political economy applications, such as networks of policymakers, interest groups, or judges

Suggested Citation

  • Squintani, Francesco, 2024. "Persuasion in Networks," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1520, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1520
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    References listed on IDEAS

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