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Strategic gradual learning and information transmission

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Abstract

Prior to advising a decision maker, the expert needs to gather information about the state of the world. This often takes time and therefore, even if the expert's learning process is unobservable, the timing of the advice is informative in itself. If learning is strategic in that the expert can choose which inspections to perform, the timing of advice may reveal not only the amount but also the type of information available to the expert. This paper studies the expert's covert and strategic process of information acquisition and its effect on the quality of advice. The main result of this paper suggests that, even in the absence of an "objective" reason to expedite information transmission, putting the biased expert under an artificial (or "strategic") pressure, can increase the amount of transmitted information and be beneficial to both players.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Economics Working Papers 1544, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1544
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    Cited by:

    1. Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023. "Slow persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
      • Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    2. Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 380-395.
    3. Kfir Eliaz & Alexander Frug, 2016. "When to Learn what in Bilateral Trade," Working Papers 936, Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Hidir, Sinem, 2017. "Information Acquisition and Credibility in Cheap Talk," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 36, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Gradual Learning; Strategic Pressure; Scheduling of Experiments; Dynamic Information Transmission; Cheap Talk.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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