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Communication with endogenous information acquisition

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  • Pei, Harry Di

Abstract

I develop a theory of communication in which a sender gathers costly information before giving advice to a receiver. In a general setting, I show that the sender always communicates all her information to the receiver in every equilibrium. In the uniform-quadratic model in which the sender can choose any finite partition as her information structure, an upwardly biased sender can convey more precise information when recommending a larger action.

Suggested Citation

  • Pei, Harry Di, 2015. "Communication with endogenous information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 132-149.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:160:y:2015:i:c:p:132-149
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    2. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
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    7. Christian Hellwig & Laura Veldkamp, 2009. "Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(1), pages 223-251.
    8. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher S. Cotton & Arnaud Déllis, 2016. "Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(4), pages 762-793.
    2. Marco Catola, 2019. "Contribution and bribe: lobbying in presence of incumbent and bureaucrat," Discussion Papers 2019/247, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    3. Inga Deimen & Dezső Szalay, 2019. "Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1349-1374, April.
    4. Kurschilgen, Michael & Marcin, Isabel, 2019. "Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 651-672.
    5. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2020. "Delegating performance evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    6. Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023. "Slow persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
      • Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    7. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 47-56, April.
    8. Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022. "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 288-304.
    9. Rossella Argenziano & Sergei Severinov & Francesco Squintani, 2016. "Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 119-155, August.
    10. Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
    11. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024. "Organizing Data Analytics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
    12. Manuel Foerster & Daniel Habermacher, 2023. "Policy-advising Competition and Endogenous Lobbies," Working Papers 229, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    13. Cai, Zhifeng & Dong, Feng, 2023. "Public disclosure and private information acquisition: A global game approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    14. Nguyen, Anh & Tan, Teck Yong, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion with costly messages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    15. Mark Whitmeyer & Kun Zhang, 2022. "Costly Evidence and Discretionary Disclosure," Papers 2208.04922, arXiv.org.
    16. Daniel Habermacher, 2022. "Authority and Specialization under Informational Interdependence," Working Papers 142, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    17. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Hitoshi Sadakane, 2020. "Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player," KIER Working Papers 1050, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    18. Foerster, Manuel & Voss, Achim, 2022. "Believe me, I am ignorant, but not biased," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    19. Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2022. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," Papers 2207.04929, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    20. Matteo Escud'e, 2023. "Covert learning and disclosure," Papers 2304.02989, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    21. Suzanne Bijkerk & Josse (J.) Delfgaauw & Vladimir (V.A.) Karamychev & Otto (O.H.) Swank, 2018. "Need to Know? On Information Systems in Firms," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-091/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    22. Mats Köster & Paul Voss, 2023. "Conversations," CESifo Working Paper Series 10275, CESifo.
    23. Yingkai Li, 2021. "Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information," Papers 2103.05788, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    24. Hidir, Sinem, 2017. "Information Acquisition and Credibility in Cheap Talk," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 36, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cheap talk; Information acquisition; Communication;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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