Communication with endogenous information acquisition
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.011
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Christopher S. Cotton & Arnaud Déllis, 2016.
"Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(4), pages 762-793.
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- Arnaud Dellis & Christopher Cotton, 2015. "Informational Lobbying And Agenda Distortion," Working Paper 1348, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Marco Catola, 2019. "Contribution and bribe: lobbying in presence of incumbent and bureaucrat," Discussion Papers 2019/247, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
- Inga Deimen & Dezső Szalay, 2019.
"Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication,"
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- Szalay, Dezső & Deimen, Inga, 2018. "Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 12706, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kurschilgen, Michael & Marcin, Isabel, 2019. "Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 651-672.
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- Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022. "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 288-304.
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- Frug, Alexander, 2018.
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Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
- Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Economics Working Papers 1544, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission," Working Papers 937, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024.
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Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
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- Manuel Foerster & Daniel Habermacher, 2023.
"Policy-advising Competition and Endogenous Lobbies,"
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229, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Foerster, Manuel & Habermacher, Daniel, 2023. "Policy-advising Competition and Endogenous Lobbies," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277613, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Cai, Zhifeng & Dong, Feng, 2023. "Public disclosure and private information acquisition: A global game approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
- Nguyen, Anh & Tan, Teck Yong, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion with costly messages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
- Mark Whitmeyer & Kun Zhang, 2022. "Costly Evidence and Discretionary Disclosure," Papers 2208.04922, arXiv.org.
- Daniel Habermacher, 2022. "Authority and Specialization under Informational Interdependence," Working Papers 142, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Yasuyuki Miyahara & Hitoshi Sadakane, 2020. "Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player," KIER Working Papers 1050, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Foerster, Manuel & Voss, Achim, 2022. "Believe me, I am ignorant, but not biased," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
- Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2022.
"Information Design in Cheap Talk,"
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2207.04929, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
- Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2023. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_470, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2022. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 199, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Matteo Escud'e, 2023. "Covert learning and disclosure," Papers 2304.02989, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
- Suzanne Bijkerk & Josse (J.) Delfgaauw & Vladimir (V.A.) Karamychev & Otto (O.H.) Swank, 2018. "Need to Know? On Information Systems in Firms," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-091/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Mats Köster & Paul Voss, 2023. "Conversations," CESifo Working Paper Series 10275, CESifo.
- Yingkai Li, 2021. "Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information," Papers 2103.05788, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
- Hidir, Sinem, 2017. "Information Acquisition and Credibility in Cheap Talk," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 36, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
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More about this item
Keywords
Cheap talk; Information acquisition; Communication;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Statistics
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