Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance
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- Tim Friehe, 2011. "On being asset-constrained in litigation contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 277-284, June.
- Anne Duchêne, 2017.
"Patent Litigation Insurance,"
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- Anne Duchêne, 2015. "Patent Litigation Insurance," Working Papers 2015-621, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
- Narang Prashant, 2011. "Regulatory Barriers to Litigation in India," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-16, October.
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2013. "A note on the timing of investments in litigation contests," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 313-326, June.
- Yang Xi & Qiao Yue, 2019. "Judicial Reform in China: From the Perspective of Legal Fee Arrangements," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 1-10, December.
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2012.
"Emotions in litigation contests,"
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- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2011. "Emotions in Litigation Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 3351, CESifo.
- Baharad, Roy & Cohen, Chen & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2022. "Litigation with adversarial efforts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
- Sung-Hoon Park & Chad E. Settle, 2023. "Asymmetric Reimbursement and Contingent Fees in Environmental Conflicts: Observable vs. Unobservable Contracts," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(4), pages 1-10, July.
- Yannick Gabuthy & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2019.
"Lawyer Fee Arrangements and Litigation Outcomes: An Auction-Theoretic Perspective,"
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2019-03, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Yannick Gabuthy & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2019. "Lawyer Fee Arrangements and Litigation Outcomes : An Auction-Theoretic Perspective," Working Papers hal-01973660, HAL.
- Lydie Ancelot & Cornel Oros, 2015.
"Physician–patient relationship and medical accident victim compensation: some insights into the French regulatory system,"
The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 16(5), pages 529-542, June.
- Lydie Ancelot & Cornel Oros, 2015. "Physician–patient relationship and medical accident victim compensation: some insights into the French regulatory system," Post-Print hal-01233219, HAL.
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2012. "Contingent fees meet the British rule: an exploratory study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 499-510, March.
- Sung-Hoon Park & Chad Settle, 2022. "Internalizing environmental damages and endogenous reimbursement in environmental conflicts: a game-theoretic analysis," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 69(4), pages 547-569, December.
- Ben C. J. van Velthoven & Carolien M. Klein Haarhuis, 2011. "Legal Aid and Legal Expenses Insurance, Complements or Substitutes? The Case of the Netherlands," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(3), pages 587-612, September.
- Nathalie Chappe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2013. "The Influence of Lawyers and Fee Arrangements on Arbitration," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 720-738, December.
- Friehe, Tim, 2010. "Contingent fees and legal expenses insurance: Comparison for varying defendant fault," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 283-290, December.
- Qiao Yue, 2010. "Legal-Expenses Insurance and Settlement," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-19, July.
- Julia Shamir & Noam Shamir, 2021. "Third-party funding in a sequential litigation process," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 169-202, August.
- Qiao, Yue, 2013. "Legal effort and optimal legal expenses insurance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 179-189.
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