Incentives, criminal defence lawyers and plea bargaining
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- ANCELOT Lydie, 2010. "Equité du plaider coupable : une analyse économétrique dans trois tribunaux de grande instance français," Working Papers of BETA 2010-09, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Frank H. Stephen, 2013. "Lawyers, Markets and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14803.
- Paolini, Gabriele, 2023. "The administratization of criminal convictions worldwide: History, extent, and consequences," ILE Working Paper Series 74, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
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