IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wut/journl/v2y2009p75-104.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Measuring conflict and power in strategic settings

Author

Listed:
  • Giovanni Rossi

Abstract

This is a quantitative approach to measuring conflict and power in strategic settings: noncooperative games (with cardinal or ordinal utilities) and blockings (without any preference specification). A (0, 1)-ranged index is provided, taking its minimum on common interest games, and its maximum on a newly introduced class termed “full conflict” games.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Rossi, 2009. "Measuring conflict and power in strategic settings," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 19(2), pages 75-104.
    • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:2:y:2009:p:75-104
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ord.pwr.edu.pl/assets/papers_archive/133%20-%20published.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2005. "Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 2017-2030, November.
    2. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    3. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Driving Forces of Informal Sanctions," IEW - Working Papers 059, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Leon A Petrosyan & Nikolay A Zenkevich, 2016. "Game Theory," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 9824, September.
    5. Van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Strategic equilibrium," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 1521-1596, Elsevier.
    6. Steven J. Brams, 1992. "A Generic Negotiation Game," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 53-66, January.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ron Holzman & Ehud Lehrer & Nathan Linial, 1988. "Some Bounds for the Banzhaf Index and Other Semivalues," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 13(2), pages 358-363, May.
    9. Gary Bornstein, 2002. "Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests," Discussion Paper Series dp297, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    10. Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2008. "Groups, cooperation and conflict in games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-17, February.
    11. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
    12. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    13. Pradeep Dubey & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1979. "Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 4(2), pages 99-131, May.
    14. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 1987. "Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(4), pages 547-572, December.
    15. Marcel van Assen & Frans Stokman & Reinier van Oosten, 2003. "Conflict Measures in Cooperative Exchange Models of Collective Decision-making," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(1), pages 85-112, February.
    16. Anderlini, Luca, 1999. "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-37, April.
    17. Robert Thomson & Frans Stokman & René Torenvlied, 2003. "Models of Collective Decision-making," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(1), pages 5-14, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christoph Engel & Michael Kurschilgen, 2011. "Fairness Ex Ante and Ex Post: Experimentally Testing Ex Post Judicial Intervention into Blockbuster Deals," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(4), pages 682-708, December.
    2. Christian Thöni, 2014. "Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 529-545, April.
    3. Kenju Kamei & Louis Putterman, 2018. "Reputation Transmission Without Benefit To The Reporter: A Behavioral Underpinning Of Markets In Experimental Focus," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 158-172, January.
    4. Poutvaara, Panu & Steinhardt, Max Friedrich, 2018. "Bitterness in life and attitudes towards immigration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 471-490.
    5. David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Punishment, Inequality and Emotions," Working Papers 0604, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    6. Cullis, John & Jones, Philip & Soliman, Amal, 2012. "‘Spite effects’ in tax evasion experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 418-423.
    7. Radu, Vranceanu & Delphine, Dubart, 2019. "Experimental evidence on deceitful communication: does everyone have a price ?," ESSEC Working Papers WP1806, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    8. repec:cup:judgdm:v:16:y:2021:i:5:p:1267-1289 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Declerck, Carolyn H. & Kiyonari, Toko & Boone, Christophe, 2009. "Why do responders reject unequal offers in the Ultimatum Game? An experimental study on the role of perceiving interdependence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 335-343, June.
    10. Anke Becker & Thomas Deckers & Thomas Dohmen & Armin Falk & Fabian Kosse, 2012. "The Relationship Between Economic Preferences and Psychological Personality Measures," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 453-478, July.
    11. Fluet, Claude & Galbiati, Rpbertp, 2016. "Lois et normes : les enseignements de l'économie comportementale," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 191-215, Mars-Juin.
    12. Stephen Cheung, 2014. "New insights into conditional cooperation and punishment from a strategy method experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 129-153, March.
    13. Tünde Paál & Tamás Bereczkei, 2015. "Punishment as a Means of Competition: Implications for Strong Reciprocity Theory," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(3), pages 1-14, March.
    14. Andreas Leibbrandt & Raúl López-Pérez, 2014. "Different carrots and different sticks: do we reward and punish differently than we approve and disapprove?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(1), pages 95-118, January.
    15. Patel, Amrish & Cartwright, Edward & Mark, Van Vugt, 2010. "Punishment Cannot Sustain Cooperation in a Public Good Game with Free-Rider Anonymity," Working Papers in Economics 451, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    16. Leibbrandt, Andreas & López-Pérez, Raúl, 2012. "An exploration of third and second party punishment in ten simple games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 753-766.
    17. Sebastian Kube & Christian Traxler, 2011. "The Interaction of Legal and Social Norm Enforcement," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 639-660, October.
    18. Guerra, Alice & Zhuravleva, Tatyana, 2021. "Do bystanders react to bribery?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 442-462.
    19. Vera Belaya & Jon Henrich Hanf, 2016. "The dark and the bright side of power: implications for the management of business-to-business relationships," Agricultural and Food Economics, Springer;Italian Society of Agricultural Economics (SIDEA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-17, December.
    20. Brandts, Jordi & Fernanda Rivas, María, 2009. "On punishment and well-being," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 823-834, December.
    21. Benjamin A. Olken & Monica Singhal, 2011. "Informal Taxation," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 1-28, October.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:2:y:2009:p:75-104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Adam Kasperski (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iopwrpl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.