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Conflict Measures in Cooperative Exchange Models of Collective Decision-making

Author

Listed:
  • Marcel van Assen

    (Department of Methodology and Statistics (MTO), Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands m.a.l.m.vanassen@uvt.nl)

  • Frans Stokman

    (ICS, University of Groningen, Grote Rozenstraat 31, 9712 TG Groningen, The Netherlands f.n.stokman@ppsw.rug.nl)

  • Reinier van Oosten

    (Decide bv, Grote Rozenstraat 31, 9712 TG Groningen, The Netherlands r.c.h.van.oosten@decide.nl)

Abstract

This study focuses on externalities of exchanges of voting positions in collective decision-making. Exchanges are represented by non-constant two-person cooperative games. It is assumed that the rate of exchange is specified by the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and a model is specified to identify the exchanges. Externality effects of these exchanges are assessed with two conflict measures we develop here. The measures assess within-group and between-group conflict, respectively, and are applied to collective decision-making in the European Union regarding support for fishery infrastructure. The application shows that the measures provide indispensable insights into the decision-making setting and that these can be used for strategic intervention in the setting. It also shows that both actors' power and the outcomes in exchange with externalities are very different from those in exchange without externalities as studied by theories of network exchange.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel van Assen & Frans Stokman & Reinier van Oosten, 2003. "Conflict Measures in Cooperative Exchange Models of Collective Decision-making," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(1), pages 85-112, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:15:y:2003:i:1:p:85-112
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463103015001072
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & Lalman, David, 1986. "Reason and War," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1113-1129, December.
    3. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jacob Dijkstra & Marcel A.L.M. Van Assen & Frans N. Stokman, 2008. "Outcomes of Collective Decisions With Externalities Predicted," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(4), pages 415-441, October.
    2. Giovanni Rossi, 2009. "Measuring conflict and power in strategic settings," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 19(2), pages 75-104.
    3. Detlef F. Sprinz & Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Steffen Kallbekken & Frans Stokman & Håkon Sælen & Robert Thomson, 2016. "Predicting Paris: Multi-Method Approaches to Forecast the Outcomes of Global Climate Negotiations," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 4(3), pages 172-187.
    4. Jacob Dijkstra & Marcel A. L. M. van Assen, 2008. "The Comparison of Four Types of Everyday Interdependencies," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(1), pages 115-143, February.
    5. Javier Arregui & Frans Stokman & Robert Thomson, 2004. "Bargaining in the European Union and Shifts in Actors’ Policy Positions," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 47-72, March.

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