Conflict Measures in Cooperative Exchange Models of Collective Decision-making
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DOI: 10.1177/1043463103015001072
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Giovanni Rossi, 2009. "Measuring conflict and power in strategic settings," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 19(2), pages 75-104.
- Javier Arregui & Frans Stokman & Robert Thomson, 2004. "Bargaining in the European Union and Shifts in Actors’ Policy Positions," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 47-72, March.
- Detlef F. Sprinz & Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Steffen Kallbekken & Frans Stokman & Håkon Sælen & Robert Thomson, 2016. "Predicting Paris: Multi-Method Approaches to Forecast the Outcomes of Global Climate Negotiations," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 4(3), pages 172-187.
- Jacob Dijkstra & Marcel A.L.M. Van Assen & Frans N. Stokman, 2008. "Outcomes of Collective Decisions With Externalities Predicted," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(4), pages 415-441, October.
- Jacob Dijkstra & Marcel A. L. M. van Assen, 2008. "The Comparison of Four Types of Everyday Interdependencies," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(1), pages 115-143, February.
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Keywords
cooperative game theory; European Union; externalities; models of collective decision-making; network exchange theory; social exchange;All these keywords.
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