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Inequality Aversion and Antisocial Punishment

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  • Thöni, Christian

Abstract

Antisocial punishment - punishment of pro-social cooperators - has shown to be detrimental for the efficiency of informal punishment mechanisms in public goods games. The motives behind antisocial punishment acts are not yet well understood. This article shows that inequality aversion predicts antisocial punishment in public goods games with punishment. The model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) allows to derive conditions under which antisocial punishment occurs. With data from three studies on public goods games with punishment I evaluate the predictions. A majority of the observed antisocial punishment acts are not compatible with inequality aversion. These results suggest that the desire to equalize payoffs is not a major determinant of antisocial punishment.

Suggested Citation

  • Thöni, Christian, 2011. "Inequality Aversion and Antisocial Punishment," Economics Working Paper Series 1111, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:usg:econwp:2011:11
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    2. Yang, Xiaojun & Nie, Zihan & Qiu, Jianying & Tu, Qin, 2020. "Institutional preferences, social preferences and cooperation: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural China," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    3. Björn Toelstede, 2019. "How path-creating mechanisms and structural lock-ins make societies drift from democracy to authoritarianism," Rationality and Society, , vol. 31(2), pages 233-262, May.
    4. Nicklisch, Andreas & Grechenig, Kristoffel & Thöni, Christian, 2016. "Information-sensitive Leviathans," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1-13.
    5. Weber, Till O. & Schulz, Jonathan F. & Beranek, Benjamin & Lambarraa-Lehnhardt, Fatima & Gächter, Simon, 2023. "The behavioral mechanisms of voluntary cooperation across culturally diverse societies: Evidence from the US, the UK, Morocco, and Turkey," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 134-152.
    6. Roux, Catherine & Thöni, Christian, 2015. "Collusion among many firms: The disciplinary power of targeted punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 83-93.
    7. Stephen Cheung, 2014. "New insights into conditional cooperation and punishment from a strategy method experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 129-153, March.
    8. Engel, Christoph, 2014. "Social preferences can make imperfect sanctions work: Evidence from a public good experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 343-353.
    9. Marie Claire Villeval, 2012. "Contribution au bien public et préférences sociales : Apports récents de l'économie comportementale," Post-Print halshs-00681348, HAL.
    10. Christoph Engel, 2013. "Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions – A Public Good Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    11. Safarzynska, Karolina, 2020. "Collective punishment promotes resource conservation if it is not enforced," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    12. Çelen, Boğaçhan & Schotter, Andrew & Blanco, Mariana, 2017. "On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 62-92.
    13. Sanjaya, Muhammad Ryan, 2023. "Antisocial behavior in experiments: What have we learned from the past two decades?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 104-115.
    14. Bruhin, Adrian & Janizzi, Kelly & Thöni, Christian, 2020. "Uncovering the heterogeneity behind cross-cultural variation in antisocial punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 291-308.
    15. Nicklisch, Andreas & Putterman, Louis & Thöni, Christian, 2021. "Trigger-happy or precisionist? On demand for monitoring in peer-based public goods provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antisocial punishment; inequality aversion;

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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