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The dark and the bright side of power: implications for the management of business-to-business relationships

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  • Vera Belaya

    (Thünen Institute)

  • Jon Henrich Hanf

    (Geisenheim University)

Abstract

The importance of power is underlined by many scientists who view it as a key behavioral construct. Power distinguishes itself as an effective tool in coordinating and promoting harmonious relationships, solving conflicts, and enhancing performance. An important challenge is to determine what role power plays in managing business-to-business relationships with specific attention to coordination and cooperation. The aim of our work is to investigate the role of power in business-to-business relationships to work out a strategy that enables managers to select an effective mix of power mechanisms. We work out and test a theoretical model of the effects of power on cooperation and coordination in business-to-business relationships and discuss possible managerial implications. To verify our research hypotheses, we conduct expert interviews via telephone about relationships of international food processing companies with their suppliers in Russia.

Suggested Citation

  • Vera Belaya & Jon Henrich Hanf, 2016. "The dark and the bright side of power: implications for the management of business-to-business relationships," Agricultural and Food Economics, Springer;Italian Society of Agricultural Economics (SIDEA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-17, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:agfoec:v:4:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1186_s40100-016-0062-9
    DOI: 10.1186/s40100-016-0062-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anna Carbone, 2017. "Food supply chains: coordination governance and other shaping forces," Agricultural and Food Economics, Springer;Italian Society of Agricultural Economics (SIDEA), vol. 5(1), pages 1-23, December.
    2. Sara Rogerson & Vendela Santén & Uni Sallnäs, 2021. "The Influence of Power and Trust on the Initiation and Duration of Modal Shift Solutions," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(7), pages 1-19, March.
    3. Xhoxhi, Orjon & Imami, Drini & Hanf, Jon & Gjokaj, Ekrem, 2022. "Too much power or no power: when does intermediary's power result into better wine and happier farmers?," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 25(5), December.
    4. Pratibha Wasan & Ashwani Kumar & Sunil Luthra, 2023. "How can banks and finance companies incorporate value chain factors in their risk management strategy? The case of agro‐food firms," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 858-877, January.
    5. Michael Paul Kramer & Linda Bitsch & Jon Hanf, 2021. "Blockchain and Its Impacts on Agri-Food Supply Chain Network Management," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-22, February.
    6. Valentinov, Vladislav & Imami, Drini & Xhoxhi, Orjon, 2024. "Contract farming in transitional economies: A stakeholder theory perspective," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 27(4), pages 633-649.

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