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Informal Taxation

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  • Benjamin A. Olken
  • Monica Singhal

Abstract

Informal payments are a frequently overlooked source of local public finance in developing countries. We use microdata from ten countries to establish stylized facts on the magnitude, form, and distributional implications of this "informal taxation." Informal taxation is widespread, particularly in rural areas, with substantial in-kind labor payments. The wealthy pay more, but pay less in percentage terms, and informal taxes are more regressive than formal taxes. Failing to include informal taxation underestimates household tax burdens and revenue decentralization in developing countries. We discuss various explanations for and implications of these observed stylized facts. (JEL H24, H27, O12, O17, O23)

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin A. Olken & Monica Singhal, 2011. "Informal Taxation," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 1-28, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:3:y:2011:i:4:p:1-28
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.3.4.1
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    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin A. Olken & Monica Singhal, 2011. "Informal Taxation," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 1-28, October.
    2. Di Falco, Salvatore & Feri, Francesco & Pin, Paolo & Vollenweider, Xavier, 2018. "Ties that bind: Network redistributive pressure and economic decisions in village economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 123-131.
    3. Denis Cogneau & Yannick Dupraz & Justine Knebelmann & Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2021. "Taxation in Africa from Colonial Times to Present Evidence from former French colonies 1900-2018," PSE Working Papers halshs-03420664, HAL.
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    5. Lucie Gadenne, 2020. "Can Rationing Increase Welfare? Theory and an Application to India's Ration Shop System," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 144-177, November.
    6. Qian, Nancy & Liu, Yu & Wen, Jaya & Fan, Haichao, 2018. "The Dynamic Effects of Computerized VAT Invoices on Chinese Manufacturing Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 12786, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Lucie Gadenne, 2017. "Tax Me, but Spend Wisely? Sources of Public Finance and Government Accountability," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 274-314, January.
    8. Wantchekon, Leonard & Riaz, Zara, 2019. "Mobile technology and food access," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 344-356.
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    17. Archambault, Caroline & Chemin, Matthieu & de Laat, Joost, 2016. "Can peers increase the voluntary contributions in community driven projects? Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PA), pages 62-77.
    18. Xia, Xing, 2021. "Barrier to Entry or Signal of Quality? The Effects of Occupational Licensing on Minority Dental Assistants," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    19. Jack, B. Kelsey & Recalde, María P., 2015. "Leadership and the voluntary provision of public goods: Field evidence from Bolivia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 80-93.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H27 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other Sources of Revenue
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O23 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development

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