IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/amposc/v48y2004i1p13-27.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny

Author

Listed:
  • Lanny W. Martin
  • Georg Vanberg

Abstract

Policymaking by coalition governments creates a classic principal‐agent problem. Coalitions are comprised of parties with divergent preferences who are forced to delegate important policymaking powers to individual cabinet ministers, thus raising the possibility that ministers will attempt to pursue policies favored by their own party at the expense of their coalition partners. What is going to keep ministers from attempting to move policy in directions they favor rather than sticking to the “coalition deal”? We argue that parties will make use of parliamentary scrutiny of “hostile” ministerial proposals to overcome the potential problems of delegation and enforce the coalition bargain. Statistical analysis of original data on government bills in Germany and the Netherlands supports this argument. Our findings suggest that parliaments play a central role in allowing multiparty governments to solve intracoalition conflicts.

Suggested Citation

  • Lanny W. Martin & Georg Vanberg, 2004. "Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(1), pages 13-27, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:13-27
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00053.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00053.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00053.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tomz, Michael & Wittenberg, Jason & King, Gary, 2003. "Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results," Journal of Statistical Software, Foundation for Open Access Statistics, vol. 8(i01).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:gig:joupla:v:6:y:2014:i:2:p:3-38 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Eligius M. T. Hendrix & Annelies Ridder & Agnieszka Rusinowska & M. Elena Sáiz, 2013. "Coalition Formation: The Role of Procedure and Policy Flexibility," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 407-427, May.
    3. Roni Lehrer & Gijs Schumacher, 2018. "Governator vs. Hunter and Aggregator: A simulation of party competition with vote-seeking and office-seeking rules," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(2), pages 1-23, February.
    4. Goodhart, Lucy, 2013. "Who Decides? Coalition Governance and Ministerial Discretion," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(3), pages 205-237, June.
    5. Wehner, Joachim & de Renzio, Paolo, 2013. "Citizens, Legislators, and Executive Disclosure: The Political Determinants of Fiscal Transparency," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 96-108.
    6. Torun Dewan & David P. Myatt, 2010. "The Declining Talent Pool of Government," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 267-286, April.
    7. Jana Paasch, 2022. "Revisiting Policy Preferences and Capacities in the EU: Multi‐level policy implementation in the subnational authorities," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 783-800, May.
    8. Abel Bojar, 2018. "With a Little Help from My Friends: Ministerial Alignment and Public Spending Composition in Parliamentary Democracies," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 133, European Institute, LSE.
    9. John W. Budd & J. Ryan Lamare, 2021. "The Importance of Political Systems for Trade Union Membership, Coverage and Influence: Theory and Comparative Evidence," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 59(3), pages 757-787, September.
    10. Thomas Winzen, 2013. "European integration and national parliamentary oversight institutions," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 297-323, June.
    11. Manow, Philip & Zorn, Hendrik, 2004. "Office versus Policy Motives in Portfolio Allocation: The Case of Junior Ministers," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/9, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    12. R. Aytimur, 2014. "Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 203-219, August.
    13. Budd, John W. & Lamare, J. Ryan, 2021. "The importance of political systems for trade union membership, coverage and influence: theory and comparative evidence," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 125307, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Alejandro Ecker & Thomas M. Meyer, 2019. "Fairness and qualitative portfolio allocation in multiparty governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 309-330, December.
    15. Göhrs, Max & Krott, Max & Hubo, Christiane, 2022. "Political parties as allies for the forestry sector: A case study from Germany," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    16. Daniel Finke & Annika Herbel, 2015. "Beyond rules and resources: Parliamentary scrutiny of EU policy proposals," European Union Politics, , vol. 16(4), pages 490-513, December.
    17. Tamer Četin & Feridun Yilmaz, 2010. "Transition to the Regulatory State in Turkey: Lessons from Energy," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(2), pages 393-402.
    18. Thomas M Meyer, 2012. "Dropping the unitary actor assumption: The impact of intra-party delegation on coalition governance," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 485-506, October.
    19. Thomas König & Bernd Luig, 2014. "Ministerial gatekeeping and parliamentary involvement in the implementation process of EU directives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 501-519, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hanne Fjelde & Desirée Nilsson, 2018. "The rise of rebel contenders," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 55(5), pages 551-565, September.
    2. Christoph Schwierz & Boris Augurzky & Axel Focke & Jürgen Wasem, 2012. "Demand, selection and patient outcomes in German acute care hospitals," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(3), pages 209-221, March.
    3. Clemens Noelke & Daniel Horn, 2011. "Social Transformation and the Transition from Vocational Education to Work," Budapest Working Papers on the Labour Market 1105, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    4. Nil Demet Gungor & Aysıt Tansel, 2008. "Brain drain from Turkey: an investigation of students' return intentions," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(23), pages 3069-3087.
    5. Jo Jakobsen & Indra De Soysa, 2006. "Do Foreign Investors Punish Democracy? Theory and Empirics, 1984–2001," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 383-410, August.
    6. P. See Lim & Colleen Barry‐Goodman & David Branham, 2006. "Discrimination that Travels: How Ethnicity Affects Party Identification for Southeast Asian Immigrants," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 87(5), pages 1158-1170, December.
    7. Alan De Bromhead & Karol Jan Borowiecki, 2016. "Immigration and the demand for life insurance: evidence from Canada, 1911," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 20(2), pages 147-175.
    8. Indra de Soysa & Jennifer Bailey & Eric Neumayer, 2004. "Free to Squander? Democracy, Institutional Design, and Economic Sustainability, 1975–2000," Macroeconomics 0412004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Danny Hayes & Seth C. McKee, 2009. "The Participatory Effects of Redistricting," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 1006-1023, October.
    10. James P. Cross, 2012. "Interventions and negotiation in the Council of Ministers of the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(1), pages 47-69, March.
    11. K. H. O'Rourke & R. Sinnott, 2001. "The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence," Trinity Economics Papers 200110, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    12. Emir Yazici, 2020. "Transborder identities, bias, and third-party conflict management," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 490-511, July.
    13. Han Dorussen, 2006. "Heterogeneous Trade Interests and Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(1), pages 87-107, February.
    14. repec:zbw:rwirep:0385 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Daniel J. Blake & Caterina Moschieri, 2017. "Policy risk, strategic decisions and contagion effects: Firm‐specific considerations," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 732-750, March.
    16. Hyung Jun Park & Richard C. Feiock, 2006. "Institutional Collective Action, Social Capital and Regional Development Partnership," International Review of Public Administration, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 57-69, January.
    17. Baum, Matt, 2000. "A Paradox of Public Opinion: Why a Less Interested Public is More Attentive to War," Institute for Social Science Research, Working Paper Series qt7200v97q, Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA.
    18. John Carey & Simon Hix, 2013. "District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: a comment and reinterpretation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 139-148, January.
    19. Lena Calahorrano, 2011. "Population Aging and Individual Attitudes toward Immigration: Disentangling Age, Cohort and Time Effects," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 389, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    20. Carlo Koos, 2016. "Does violence pay? The effect of ethnic rebellion on overcoming political deprivation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(1), pages 3-24, February.
    21. Brian Frederick & Matthew J. Streb, 2008. "Women Running for Judge: The Impact of Sex on Candidate Success in State Intermediate Appellate Court Elections," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 89(4), pages 937-954, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:13-27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5907 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.