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Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government

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  • Aytimur, Refik Emre

Abstract

Lobbying a coalition government is different than lobbying a single-party government, since in the case of a coalition government, the interest group can intervene in the intragovernmental decision process. In the case where the interest group likes the status quo more than the surplus maximizing policy, the interest group influences the policy without any contribution thanks to its credible threat to block unfavorable proposals. We show further that when, say, a leftist coalition government may be replaced by a rightist coalition government, the final policy reflects a rightist interest group's preferences more heavily due to the interest group's forward-looking considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • Aytimur, Refik Emre, 2013. "Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 162, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cegedp:162
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lobbying; policy-making; coalition governments; status quo;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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