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Transition to the Regulatory State in Turkey: Lessons from Energy

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  • Tamer Četin
  • Feridun Yilmaz

Abstract

Turkey has recently reshaped its own institutional structure by establishing Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs). However, the political authority has not desired to delegate the political property rights to IRAs. Although IRAs is de jure established, the political conflicts occuring during the evolution of the traditional-patrimonial state to the regulatory state de facto impede IRAs to institutionalize. This paper observes recent policy changes during the transition and lessons from the energy regulation in Turkey. So, the paper reveals whether the change in the regulatory institutional structure of Turkey is an effective policy in terms of transition to the institutions of capitalism.

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  • Tamer Četin & Feridun Yilmaz, 2010. "Transition to the Regulatory State in Turkey: Lessons from Energy," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(2), pages 393-402.
    • Handle: RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:44:y:2010:i:2:p:393-402
    DOI: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624440211
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Erisa Dautaj Şenerdem & K. Ali Akkemik, 2020. "Evaluation of the reform in the Turkish electricity sector: a CGE analysis," International Journal of Economic Policy Studies, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 389-419, August.
    2. Isik Ozel, 2012. "The politics of de‐delegation: Regulatory (in)dependence in Turkey," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 119-129, March.
    3. Özgün AKDURAN-EROL, 2024. "Regulation of Natural Monopoly: The Turkish Electricity Market," Sosyoekonomi Journal, Sosyoekonomi Society, issue 32(60).

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