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Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility

Author

Listed:
  • Eligius Hendrix

    (WUR - Wageningen University and Research [Wageningen])

  • Annelies de Ridder

    (Nijmegen School of Management - Nijmegen School of Management - Radboud University [Nijmegen])

  • Agnieszka Rusinowska

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Elena Saiz

    (Nijmegen School of Management - Nijmegen School of Management - Radboud University [Nijmegen])

Abstract

A spatial model of coalition formation is used together with data from Dutch elections and theoretical instances to study different procedures of coalition formation. The model shows that procedure plays an important role in reaching a coalition agreement and that political parties do not necessarily benefit from being a first-mover. Moreover, it is shown that a decrease in a party's flexibility can be (dis)advantageous in coalition negotiations. Furthermore, certain power sharing tactics appear not always to lead to an agreement that is in a party's advantage. The main message put forward is that the procedure of forming a coalition plays a more important role than is usually acknowledged in literature and practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Eligius Hendrix & Annelies de Ridder & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Elena Saiz, 2013. "Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility," Post-Print hal-00666849, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00666849
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-011-9276-0
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00666849
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Annelies De Ridder & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2008. "On Some Procedures of Forming a Multipartner Alliance," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(2), pages 443-487, June.
    2. Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder & Aaron B. Strauss & Michael M. Ting, 2005. "Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(3), pages 550-563, July.
    3. Laver, Michael, 2005. "Policy and the Dynamics of Political Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(2), pages 263-281, May.
    4. Steven Brams & Michael Jones & D. Kilgour, 2005. "Forming stable coalitions: The process matters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 67-94, July.
    5. Enelow,James M. & Hinich,Melvin J., 1984. "The Spatial Theory of Voting," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521275156, October.
    6. Baron, David P., 1993. "Government Formation and Endogenous Parties," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 34-47, March.
    7. Budge, Ian, 1994. "A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(4), pages 443-467, October.
    8. Warwick, Paul V., 2005. "When Far Apart Becomes Too Far Apart: Evidence for a Threshold Effect in Coalition Formation," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 383-401, July.
    9. Lanny W. Martin & Georg Vanberg, 2004. "Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(1), pages 13-27, January.
    10. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
    11. Craig Volden & Clifford J. Carrubba, 2004. "The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 521-537, July.
    12. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 405-422, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Annelies De Ridder & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2008. "On Some Procedures of Forming a Multipartner Alliance," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(2), pages 443-487, June.
    2. Tom Blockmans & Marie-Anne Guerry, 2015. "Probabilistic Spatial Power Indexes: The Impact of Issue Saliences and Distance Selection," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 675-697, July.
    3. Tom Blockmans & Marie-Anne Guerry, 2016. "Coalition Formation Procedures: The Impact of Issue Saliences and Consensus Estimation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 481-499, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coalition formation; Elections; Maneuvering space; Step-by-step procedure; Simultaneous procedure; Minimal winning coalition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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