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The Impact of Collective-Bargaining Legislation on Disputes in the U.S. Public Sector: No Legislation May Be the Worst Legislation

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  • Currie, Janet
  • McConnell, Sheena

Abstract

This article estimates the impact of collective-bargaining legislation on disputes during labor negotiations in the U.S. public sector. We use a large national sample of U.S. state and local government contracts to compare the incidence and intensity of disputes by similar workers under different forms of collective-bargaining legislation. The breadth of our data allows us to examine the impact of five different forms of legislation. Our principal finding is that dispute costs are highest in jurisdictions that provide no explicit framework for bargaining or dispute resolution. Strikes are as frequent and as long when they are illegal and employers are not required to bargain with employees as when they are legal but employers are required to bargain. Arbitration is most frequently used when formal institutions for arbitration have been provided. Copyright 1994 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Currie, Janet & McConnell, Sheena, 1994. "The Impact of Collective-Bargaining Legislation on Disputes in the U.S. Public Sector: No Legislation May Be the Worst Legislation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 519-547, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:37:y:1994:i:2:p:519-47
    DOI: 10.1086/467322
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski, 1988. "When Public Sector Workers Unionize," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number free88-1.
    2. Freeman, Richard B. & Ichniowski, Casey (ed.), 1988. "When Public Sector Workers Unionize," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226261669, September.
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    6. Tracy, Joseph S, 1987. "An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(2), pages 149-173, April.
    7. Reder, Melvin W & Neumann, George R, 1980. "Conflict and Contract: The Case of Strikes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(5), pages 867-886, October.
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    10. Gregory M. Saltzman, 1985. "Bargaining Laws as a Cause and Consequence of the Growth of Teacher Unionism," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 38(3), pages 335-351, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marselli, Riccardo & McCannon, Bryan C. & Vannini, Marco, 2015. "Bargaining in the shadow of arbitration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 356-368.
    2. Michele Campolieti & Robert Hebdon & Benjamin Dachis, 2016. "Collective Bargaining in the Canadian Public Sector, 1978–2008: The Consequences of Restraint and Structural Change," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 54(1), pages 192-213, March.
    3. repec:ilo:ilowps:453417 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Michele Campolieti & Robert Hebdon & Benjamin Dachis, 2014. "The Impact of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strike Activity and Wage Settlements," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 394-429, July.

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