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Evasion costs and the theory Of conscription

Author

Listed:
  • John Warner
  • Sebastian Negrusa

Abstract

Many countries of Europe are moving from conscripted to volunteer military forces. This paper examines the current status of those conversions and interprets them in light of an economic model of the military manpower procurement system choice developed in Warner and Asch (1996). The theoretical model is expanded to include the social costs of individuals' attempts to evade conscription and the government's cost of preventing it. Differences in evasion costs may be a significant factor in some European countries' decisions to keep conscription and other countries' decisions to end it.

Suggested Citation

  • John Warner & Sebastian Negrusa, 2005. "Evasion costs and the theory Of conscription," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(2), pages 83-100.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:16:y:2005:i:2:p:83-100
    DOI: 10.1080/10242690500083626
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Asch, Beth J & Warner, John T, 2001. "A Theory of Compensation and Personnel Policy in Hierarchical Organizations with Application to the United States Military," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(3), pages 523-562, July.
    2. John T. Warner & Beth J. Asch, 2001. "The Record and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Military in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 169-192, Spring.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Berck & Jonathan Lipow, 2011. "Military Conscription and the (Socially) Optimal Number of Boots on the Ground," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(1), pages 95-106, July.
    2. Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2011. "The Political Economy of Conscription," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Renaud Bellais & Martial Foucault & Jean-Michel Oudot, 2014. "Économie de la défense," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01052607, HAL.
    4. Jonathan Lipow & Jay Simon, 2014. "Probability segmenting and the social cost of draft evasion," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(1), pages 307-312.
    5. Nikitas Konstantinidis, 2020. "Military conscription, external security, and income inequality: The missing link," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 312-347, April.
    6. Katarina Keller & Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2009. "Military Draft And Economic Growth In Oecd Countries," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(5), pages 373-393, October.
    7. Yew-Kwang Ng, 2008. "Why is the Military Draft Common? Conscription and Increasing Returns," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 9(2), pages 373-384, November.
    8. Timothy J. Perri, 2010. "The Draft and the Quality of Military Personnel," Working Papers 10-05, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    9. Thomas Koch & Javier Birchenall, 2016. "Taking versus taxing: an analysis of conscription in a private information economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 177-199, June.
    10. Timothy Perri, 2011. "Uncle Sam Wants Whom? The Draft and the Quality of Military Personnel," Working Papers 11-12, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    11. Vincenzo Bove & Elisa Cavatorta, 2012. "From Conscription To Volunteers: Budget Shares In Nato Defence Spending," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 273-288, February.
    12. Casey B. Mulligan, 2015. "In-Kind Taxes, Behavior, and Comparative Advantage," NBER Working Papers 21586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    JEL Codes: H21; H56; J31; J33; J38; J45;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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