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Conscription: Economic costs and political allure

Author

Listed:
  • Panu Poutvaara

    (University of Helsinki)

  • Andreas Wagener

    (University of Hanover)

Abstract

Since Adam Smith, most economists have held that a professional army is superior to a conscript army, thanks to benefitting from comparative advantage and specialization. We summarize recent literature on the benefits and costs of the military draft, with special emphasis on its dynamic effects on human capital formation. Empirical evidence refutes the claim that the economic costs of the draft would be balanced by increased democratic control or reduced likelihood of war. Rather, the political allure of conscription seems to arise from the possibility to concentrate the tax burden on a minority of voters in a way that is generally held to be unacceptable with normal taxation.

Suggested Citation

  • Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2007. "Conscription: Economic costs and political allure," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 2(1), pages 6-15, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:epc:journl:v:2:y:2006:i:1:p:6-15
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    File URL: http://www.epsjournal.org.uk/index.php/EPSJ/article/view/35
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Angrist, Joshua D, 1990. "Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence from Social Security Administrative Records," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 313-336, June.
    2. John T. Warner & Beth J. Asch, 2001. "The Record and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Military in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 169-192, Spring.
    3. Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1995. "The Economics of Defense," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521447287, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Antonis Adam, 2012. "Military conscription as a means of stabilizing democratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 715-730, March.
    2. Bäckström, Peter, 2020. "Essays on Military Labour Supply in the Era of Voluntary Recruitment," Umeå Economic Studies 965, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    3. Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2011. "The Political Economy of Conscription," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Lukasz Wiktor Olejnik, 2023. "Economic growth and military expenditure in the countries on NATOʼs Eastern flank in 1999–2021," Bank of Estonia Working Papers wp2023-2, Bank of Estonia, revised 09 May 2023.
    5. Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2011. "Ending Military Conscription," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(02), pages 36-43, July.
    6. Katarina Keller & Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2009. "Military Draft And Economic Growth In Oecd Countries," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(5), pages 373-393, October.
    7. Brauer, Jurgen & Caruso, Raul, 2011. "Peace economists and peace economics," MPRA Paper 34927, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Danko Tarabar & Joshua C. Hall, 2015. "Explaining the Worldwide Decline in Military Conscription: 1970-2010," Working Papers 15-30, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    9. David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2018. "Military Service of Politicians, Public Policy, and Parliamentary Decisions," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 64(4), pages 639-666.
    10. Yew-Kwang Ng, 2008. "Why is the Military Draft Common? Conscription and Increasing Returns," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 9(2), pages 373-384, November.
    11. Danko Tarabar & Joshua C. Hall, 2016. "Explaining the worldwide decline in the length of mandatory military service, 1970–2010," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 55-74, July.
    12. Thomas Koch & Javier Birchenall, 2016. "Taking versus taxing: an analysis of conscription in a private information economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 177-199, June.
    13. Lyk-Jensen, Stéphanie Vincent, 2018. "Does peacetime military service affect crime? New evidence from Denmark’s conscription lotteries," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 245-262.
    14. Kumari, Anita & Kumar Sharma, Anil, 2017. "Infrastructure financing and development: A bibliometric review," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 49-65.
    15. repec:ces:ifodic:v:9:y:2011:i:2:p:16134080 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Marta Schoch, 2020. "Essays on political economy, inequality and development," Economics PhD Theses 0120, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
    17. Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2011. "Ending Military Conscription," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(2), pages 36-43, 07.
    18. Bäckström, Peter, 2023. "Empirical Essays on Military Service and the Labour Market," Umeå Economic Studies 1012, Umeå University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conscription; economic costs;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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