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The Draft and the Quality of Military Personnel

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  • Timothy J. Perri

Abstract

It has been argued the draft may enable the military to attract more able individuals than a volunteer military, and thus increase welfare. In our theoretical model, we find this may be the case if a volunteer military simply takes the least able individuals. When the military tests individuals and does not take the lowest quality applicants, neither a random draft nor a draft with testing increases welfare, and both usually decrease welfare. Only if testing is relatively costly would a random draft dominate a volunteer military with testing. Key Words:

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy J. Perri, 2010. "The Draft and the Quality of Military Personnel," Working Papers 10-05, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:apl:wpaper:10-05
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    1. Ross, Thomas W, 1994. "Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 109-131, April.
    2. John Warner & Sebastian Negrusa, 2005. "Evasion costs and the theory Of conscription," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(2), pages 83-100.
    3. Timothy J. Perri, 2008. "The Economics of US Civil War Conscription," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 10(2), pages 424-453.
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