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External recruitments and firm performance

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  • Pedro Martins
  • Francisco Lima

Abstract

In the context of tournament theory, and drawing on a panel data set of several firms and their employees, evidence is presented of a negative relationship between the share of external recruitments for top management positions and firm productivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Pedro Martins & Francisco Lima, 2006. "External recruitments and firm performance," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(14), pages 911-915.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:13:y:2006:i:14:p:911-915
    DOI: 10.1080/13504850500426129
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Eriksson, Tor, 1999. "Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 262-280, April.
    3. Pedro Martins & Jim Jin, 2010. "Firm-level social returns to education," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 23(2), pages 539-558, March.
    4. Kong-Pin Chen, 2005. "External Recruitment as an Incentive Device," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 259-278, April.
    5. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563, Elsevier.
    6. Chan, William, 1996. "External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 555-570, October.
    7. Huson, Mark R. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Parrino, Robert, 2004. "Managerial succession and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 237-275, November.
    8. George Baker & Michael Gibbs & Bengt Holmstrom, 1994. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 881-919.
    9. Francisco Lima, 2003. "The Careers of Top Managers and Firm Openness: Internal Versus External Labour Markets," Working Papers w200315, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
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    Cited by:

    1. Figueiredo Tavares, Marisa Fernanda, 2020. "Across establishments, within firms: worker’s mobility, knowledge transfer and survival," Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 54(1), pages 1-2.
    2. Sushanta K. MALLICK & Ricardo M. SOUSA, 2017. "The skill premium effect of technological change: New evidence from United States manufacturing," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 156(1), pages 113-131, March.
    3. Marisa Fernanda Figueiredo Tavares, 2020. "Across establishments, within firms: worker’s mobility, knowledge transfer and survival," Journal for Labour Market Research, Springer;Institute for Employment Research/ Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), vol. 54(1), pages 1-19, December.

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